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The first of seven articles in this issue comments on the conservatism of the current Soviet political leadership, and points out that "The Soviet Union has rapidly become representative of one of the most backward of social systems in an age when individuals and groups are demanding complete personal expression and fulfillment."

Politics in Soviet Russia

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AS THE COMMUNIST party begins its second half century of ruling Russia, only the lexicon is still revolutionary; the operative policies of the ruling party stress stability and a feeling that the Soviet Union has arrived and is part of the world establishment. Typical of the post-Khrushchevian leadership, the fiftieth anniversary of the regime in the fall of 1967 was celebrated by modest reforms and gifts to the population in the form of a small increase in the standard of living, a reduction of income taxes on lower incomes, the raising of the minimum wage from 45 to 60 rubles, and a general extension of the five-day week to most workers. The speeches, the slogans and the celebrations were repetitious of previous anniversaries and May Days. Any hint of radical reforms has been dropped. The party handbook no longer speaks of the current period of development as "the large scale building of communism," but merely refers to "building the basis of communism." Even the drafting of a new constitution promised in 1967 seems to have been dropped and the old Stalin Constitution of 1936 has been declared inadequate.

The regime's emphasis *ad nauseum* on the well-being and stability of Soviet society is

due in large part to the regime's inability to find any other basis on which to establish its popularity and combat growing schisms in the Soviet system. Coercion is important against outright dissent, but it is doubtful that the present leaders could survive if they used terror as the primary means of support as did Josef Stalin. The current regime, furthermore, is without charismatic appeal, and the youth and the educated are too sophisticated to accept any longer the platitudes of the ideology. They recognize the slogans as important symbols of Russia's power, but they know that the ideology cannot solve the real problems of Soviet society and that its appeal abroad, including Eastern Europe, has declined.

The rhetoric and glow of the fiftieth anniversary celebrations could not cover the growing tensions within Soviet society. Two distinct areas of conflict have been emerging. One field of contest lies within the top hierarchy of the party, the government, the military, the economy and academia. These special interests have grown more powerful and are the inevitable result of the advancing specialization and educational level of Soviet society, and the breakdown of the totalitarian system. Their demands for special policies

and a larger share of the spoils cannot be ignored or denied. The other field of battle—and potentially the more dangerous—is to be found in the extra wide generational gap existing in the Soviet Union as a result of the war and the break with Stalinism and in the intellectual gap between the simple and rigid nineteenth century ideas of Marx-Leninism and the wide variety of intellectual currents that are filtering in from abroad.

The first field of contest is confined almost exclusively to the older men who rose to important positions under Stalin and are wedded to traditional Communist ideology. These elite groups are represented in and by the Central Committee of the Communist party, about 95 per cent of whose full members entered the party before 1955.¹ These elites with a median age of 56 years stand united with the Politbureau, resist the influx of younger groups and re-elect themselves to the Central Committee.² Nevertheless, their personal ambitions for power, their education and their leadership of particular sectors give them special interests which they seek to advance and protect. Western observers gradually have come to identify in Soviet politics a "farm lobby," "military lobbies," heavy industry groups, regional groups, and so forth.

Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin, as the acknowledged leaders and spokesmen for these elites, see their roles not as dictators or as leaders of the two largest aggregated groups—the party and government bureaucracies—but (much in the fashion of Western political leaders) as moderators among interest groups. They see debate among interest groups and their moderating role as the primary means to rationalize and balance the system distorted first by Josef Stalin and then by the "hare-

brained schemes" of Nikita Khrushchev. But at the same time they are also leaders in an autocracy; they make it their concern to promote policies which protect the system, and appoint as heads of departments those who are personally loyal and conservative but not reactionary in their views. Brezhnev and Kosygin are careful to stress that theirs is not a totalitarian system. They avoid Stalinists and, thus far, Stalinism. While they have restored Stalin to a positive place in history, they stress that it was really the continued operation of the collective party even under Stalin that explained the great advances of the Soviet Union in the 1930's and 1940's.

SERIOUS IMBALANCES

Shortly after the death of Stalin, his lieutenants publicly acknowledged that one of the most serious imbalances of the system was the inequitable development of agriculture and the low income of the farmer. Sporadically, Khrushchev tried to improve the situation, but only after his fall did the new regime, led by the "farm lobby" and its leader, D.S. Poliansky, a member of the Politbureau, make a concerted effort and adopt a series of fundamental changes. It increased government procurement prices and investment in agriculture,³ established guaranteed farm wages, reversed Khrushchev's restrictions on the private garden plots, reformed the organization and powers of farm organizations, and launched a general campaign to raise the status of peasants. As a result both private and collective farm output has significantly improved over the last three years and the standard of living of the peasant has been raised (average earnings of peasant *kolkhozniks* increased by 42 per cent 1964–1967).

The gap between the city and village, however, is still great, and it is doubtful that the flow of youth and skilled manpower to the city has yet slowed. Typical of the balancing effect of the new regime, the leadership toward the end of 1967 began to blunt its own thrust in support of agriculture. It allowed the opposition to the "farm lobby" to debate against further investments and then used this opposition to cut investment for agricul-

¹ At the April, 1968, plenum of the Central Committee a member of the younger generation, K. F. Katushev, was at last appointed to the party secretariat. He is only 41 years old and joined the party in 1952.

² In 1966, 80 per cent of the full members of the Central Committee were re-elected compared to 50 per cent in 1961 under Nikita Khrushchev, who tried to introduce large turnovers in all party leadership posts.

³ Productive investment in agriculture was 20.2 billion rubles in 1961–1965, compared to 35.6 billion planned for 1966–1970.

ture from Brezhnev's 1965 promise of 41 billion rubles for 1966–1970 to 35.6 billion.

The debate and changes in the school reforms in the last three years have followed the same pattern. On the one hand, Khrushchev's radical proposals have been dropped and there is no longer any forced association of schooling and practical work as the basis for training and advancement to higher schools. On the other hand, greater flexibility of curriculum has been introduced, permission for local areas to experiment has been granted, and gradually the system is being made ready for compulsory secondary education. During the past year, there has also been wide and apparently free discussion in the press of the problems of admission into higher schools and methods to achieve more equitable education for all children.

In housing construction, a similar balanced approach is evident. The complex construction apparatus inherited from Stalin has been slowly reorganized along centralized lines. This was started by Khrushchev, who quickly realized his decentralization scheme was not going to work for construction. While still keeping centralized administration and controls, the post-Khrushchevian leadership in February, 1967, split the administration of construction along functional lines into the Ministry for Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, the Ministry of Industrial Construction, the Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of Rural Construction. At the same time, it gave local communities greater authority to decide where and under what conditions new housing will be built, and it granted construction firms increased autonomy.

But in housing, as in many sections of the economy, the major deficiency is poor quality. It is a subject of lengthy debates and discussions but little improvement. None of the reforms have really reached the problem and within the present framework of the Soviet system no real solution has been found. (This was one factor behind the attempted Czech reforms. Better quality is essential if the socialist countries want to continue to develop and compete on the world market.)

INDUSTRIAL REFORM

The reluctance to alter basic Communist patterns is particularly striking in the manner in which the general industrial reform has been handled. All except a few Stalinists recognized that some reforms were essential, and there was general agreement that Khrushchev's decentralization schemes were a fiasco. After extensive debate, starting on a small scale in 1966 and extending to the rest of the economy in 1967–1968, it was decided to stress the profit index calculated as a percentage of resources and to give the industrial manager greater autonomy to arrange his production; to allow limited direct relations between the consumer and supplier; and to base prices at least in part on scarcity and the value of input. Typically, however, these reforms were hedged and key decisions were avoided.

In addition, other changes were introduced with the opposite intent i.e., to increase centralization. For example, the allocation of material supplies was simplified and consolidated under central control. Consequently, the reform was only a hesitant first step in loosening up the rigid, bureaucratic controls. Nevertheless, the first results were successful in bringing forth some of the hidden reserves and in 1967 industrial production increased ten per cent (the highest in a decade) and estimated gross national product was up six per cent. The scoffers were laughed at and the reform was proclaimed an outstanding success. But many Soviet economists knew that the success would be short-lived if additional changes did not follow the first experiment. Thus in January, 1968, a new debate began among Soviet economists. Significantly, the debate is again being publicly led by Professor Evsei Liberman, who was the spokesman for the original campaign for reform. The reformers point to three major areas of complaint: centralized resource allocation, the unrealistic price structure, and "formal administrativeness."

As long as the planning bodies tightly control material and financial resource allocations to industry, the autonomy of the plant manager is largely fictitious. He cannot overfulfill

his quota, change his product or alter the distribution of his products to meet the demands of the consumer without the government planning agency, Gosplan, approving the change of resource allocation. Thus the central authorities maintain their absolute veto over production plans.

Western economists generally agree that the key to efficient economic allocation and planning is a realistic cost and price system. Increasingly, Soviet economists have recognized this fact and the fact that the bureaucratic and socially-based costs and prices traditional in the Soviet Union do not meet efficiency criteria. Gradually, more economic factors have been introduced in Soviet calculations such as charges for the use of capital and relative scarcity. Although some other Communist countries are experimenting in a limited way with competitively set prices based on the market system, in the Soviet Union prices, except for collective farm markets, remain strictly bureaucratic decisions, and there is no thought of changing the method. The reformers, however, are suggesting additional economic criteria, such as employing land rent or royalty depending on the relative value of the land or deposit. Thus, by collecting a higher land rent from those factories in more favorable locations and from extracting industries with higher quality or more accessible ores, the difference in production costs between firms operating with the same efficiency could be narrowed. It was reported that a standing commission of the Supreme Soviet was taking the first step in this direction and would consider a new land law which would include rent, in order to curb waste and abuse of space particularly around cities.

Complaints concerning unnecessary "formal administrativeness" and the continued bureaucratic and arbitrary behavior of planners and ministerial administrators are varied and numerous. Planners, for example, still refuse to establish long-range norms; plant managers refuse to try to overfulfill short-range norms fearing that the norms will be raised the very next year. Ministries still arbitrarily take away savings

achieved by cuts in labor costs and production changes, although the savings are supposed to remain with the industrial enterprises; and bureaucrats continue to force managers to keep on surplus labor in order to avoid unemployment.

The leadership, by allowing discussions on the need for additional reforms and relaxation of bureaucratic controls even after a year of unprecedented growth, seems to recognize that for the economy to continue to expand additional loosening of the economic system is required. If the leaders continued to allow relaxation even in small increments, in a period of two or three decades some fundamental changes might occur. Some analysts felt there was a fundamental change in the decision to increase consumer production in 1968 more rapidly than heavy industry. They interpreted this as a concession to popular demands and, therefore, as a shift in the basic emphasis of the regime. But one must guard against wishful thinking, because a closer look indicates that military expenditures were also increased for 1968, and that a temporary shift to consumer production has been necessary to make good the gifts promised to the population during the fiftieth anniversary and to reverse a rising inflationary trend. Thus all signs still point to an all-out effort on the part of the leadership to hold back radical change and justify and retain the basic Communist system with as little alteration as possible. Thus it is not from the Soviet leaders of today that one should expect liberalization, but outside of these circles, where the pressure is building.

FORCES OF CHANGE

The Soviet Union is surrounded by a world undergoing rapid social change. This is true not only in the ex-colonial world but in the West and in the Communist nations of East Europe and China. The Soviet Union has rapidly become representative of one of the most backward of social systems, in an age when individuals and groups are demanding complete personal expression and fulfillment. It has been saved from abrupt social upheavals by a strong authoritarian regime and

by its long isolation from the rest of the world imposed by Stalin and partially continued by the post-Stalin leadership. The forces of change, however, have been slowly penetrating the iron curtain. The leadership only occasionally admits the existence of these dark forces and attributes them to the subversive forces of imperialism trying to undermine the glorious life under socialism. The occasional manuscripts smuggled out to the West, the letters of protest against censorship and controls which circulate among Soviet intellectuals, the small band of protesters who steadfastly crusade against the political trials of Soviet writers in spite of retaliation and threats by the secret police,⁴ and the widespread unrest among Soviet youth point to the fermenting of demands for change. But how numerous these disruptive forces are is impossible to determine. It is doubtful that the Soviet leadership, itself, knows; communications up through the Soviet hierarchy have always been difficult. The Soviet leaders are even less knowledgeable than Western politicians about how a spark of discontent can become a full-scale student demonstration, a general denunciation of the system by intellectuals and younger bureaucrats, a nationalistic revolt against alien rule, or a full-scale mass upheaval. This may in part explain the surge of Soviet interest in sociology. Although Soviet sociologists cannot ask the crucial questions of the population in their surveys, their reports give some idea of popular attitudes.

THE CZECH CRISIS

Even though the Soviet leaders do not know the size or nature of the subversive movement, they have a traditional Russian

and Communist fear of anarchist upheavals and in the past year have reacted strongly. The Soviet establishment is well aware that much of the violence in the West started with minor student protests and that the Czech liberalization began in the summer of 1967 with the protests of the Slovaks against domination by the Czechs and with the Czech writers speaking out against controls and censorship. There is no question that fears for domestic tranquility played a major role in the way the Soviet Politbureau handled the Czech crisis. The intellectuals in the Ukraine bordering Slovakia have been restive,⁵ and the demands of Czech writers against censorship have been duplicated in the recent underground protests of Soviet writers. Thus it is not surprising that the Soviet leadership reacted with alarm and used all means to reverse the Czech reforms.

Fearing the *sub-rosa* forces in Soviet society, the party has launched a major campaign to combat them. One tactic has been to try to reimpose some isolation from the rest of the world. The Soviet press tends to avoid, if possible, reporting social changes going on inside and outside the Communist world or conceals the full character and implications of these events by attributing them to imperialist plots. There are also frequent official pronouncements warning Russians not to become involved with foreigners. Traitorous links with the West are given prominence in the political trials of Soviet writers. Although the leaders have avoided cutting off all contacts with the West because they have a high respect for Western know-how and acknowledge their need to learn from it,⁶ they are limiting further exchanges. For example, in the recent agreement on student and young faculty exchanges with the United States, the number of exchanges has been cut from 40 to 30 a year each way.

This last year has also witnessed a marked increase in controls over Soviet intellectual life—almost a return to Stalinism. In addition to political trials, the insane asylum has been used to banish writers and, in the case of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who wrote *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*,⁷ he has al-

⁴ The most recent episode was the trial of four young intellectuals, arrested in January, 1967, and not tried until January, 1968. They were accused of being agents and disseminating materials of *N.T.S.*, an anti-Soviet underground movement with headquarters in West Europe.

⁵ It is reported some 15 Ukrainian writers have been sent to labor camps in secret trials within the last two years.

⁶ For example, *Business America*, by N. Smelyakov, published in Moscow, 1967, favorably reports the distinctive features of United States production techniques.

⁷ (New York: Praeger, 1963.)

leged that the secret police smuggled out his manuscripts to discredit him as a traitor and to prevent his new works from being published in the Soviet Union. The climax was reached at the various writers' meetings in the spring of 1968 at which dissenters were denounced and a strict ideological line was imposed on all authors.

In addition to suppressive measures against subversion, the Communist leadership has sought to combat it by positive means through raising the physical well-being of the population, strengthening the party's supremacy, and improving indoctrination. In raising living standards, the Politbureau has decreed a continued small percentage increase each year, and for the first time has sought to consult with the population as to its desires. One of the purposes of the general industrial reform was to permit the retailer to order from the manufacturer what the consumer really wanted. Furthermore, polls and sociological studies of the population's time allocations and desires are being applied to the provision of housing, public services and recreation.

In an attempt to revitalize the party, Leonid Brezhnev, as the party leader, has concentrated on improving the quality and the representativeness of the party cadres by recruiting more workers and peasants into the rank and file and by raising the educational level of the party bureaucracy. He is also emphasizing the traditional roles of the party: to rule by "issuing the leading directives" to all organs of society and through party members within these organs organizing and controlling activities.

Thus, while promoting the authority of the party, Brezhnev is also trying to withdraw the party from direct administration because such close involvement in the economy is not effective and is actively opposed by government leaders. In fact, efforts are being made at the same time to revitalize the soviets and some of the public organs to supplement party control. Initially as a reaction against Khrushchev, the new leaders allowed the numerous public organs organized by him to decline, but they have come to recognize the

great social power of such organs as the comradesly courts and auxiliary militia (*druzhini*) which neither the party or the government can duplicate.

INDOCTRINATION METHODS

Indoctrination methods in the Soviet Union have changed little in the last two or three decades, although they have become less and less effective. In the last two years, the regime has given the problem special attention, devoting at least two plenary sessions of the Central Committee to it in the last two years. But all the discussions have only added up to some organizational changes and more drum beating while the content of the ideology has returned almost to Stalinist orthodoxy. Instead of innovation and new ideas, there have been greater rigidity and more intensive attacks on right and left Communists and bourgeois ideology, particularly during the height of the Czech crisis. There is also evidence that those who disagreed and spoke against a return to orthodoxy in the Central Committee Plenum—such as S. P. Pavlov, former head of the *Komsomols*, and N. G. Yegoychev, former First Party Secretary of Moscow—have been demoted.

The important organizational change in indoctrination has been to abolish gradually the system of agitators. It was the task of the agitator to transmit the official line to the masses in face-to-face relations. Recently, he has been found wanting because of his general lack of sophistication and his inability to answer the questions of the population. He is being replaced by the *politinform*, who has a much larger constituency of 20 or more but who is much better trained to answer questions. There has also been a major effort to bolster the social sciences exhorting

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In writing of the implications of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, this author shows that "[it] signifies the full flowering of the Soviet state as a traditional imperialist state, whose influence and role in the world are determined not by the attractiveness of its ideology but the enormity of its power and its determination to employ it in its self-interest."

The Aftermath of the Czech Invasion

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THE SOVIET OCCUPATION of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, the thirtieth anniversary of the Munich Pact and the twentieth anniversary of the internal Communist party coup of 1948, signals an ominous turn in Soviet relationships with East Europe, whose full implications for internal Soviet developments, Sino-Soviet relations, the world Communist movement, East-West relations and particularly for Soviet-American relations are as yet not fully predictable.

Not only has the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia reversed a welcome tendency on the part of the Soviet leaders to exercise self-restraint in their dealings with Moscow's former vassal states, but it also calls into question the internal political stability, judgment and even basic honesty of the Soviet regime. The occupation, coming as it did hard on the heels of the Cierna and Bratislava meetings between the Soviet and Czech hierarchies, is bound to raise once again the entire question of the role of duplicity as a conscious and calculated instrument of Soviet diplomacy.¹

The 1968 subjugation of Czechoslovakia

signifies a phase in which the naked security and national interests of the Soviet Union have been unambiguously given a higher priority in Soviet calculations than ideological considerations. Whatever the rationalizations that were used by the U.S.S.R. to justify its intervention in Czech affairs, they were only cursorily invoked and failed to persuade most of the Communist parties of the world. The Soviet action provoked condemnation by China, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania among Communist countries and elicited denunciation by the leadership of the French and Italian Communist parties. The flimsiness of Moscow's ideological pretext was further exposed by the frank Polish admission that Warsaw cooperated in the venture on grounds of "reasons of state."

There is little reason to doubt that the Soviet leaders were aware of many grave risks. One must assume that their action was conscious and deliberate although it may have been taken after acrimonious and bitter controversy and probably against the better judgment of a substantial segment of the Soviet leadership. Why? The indications are that once again the interests of the Soviet Union as the leader of a revolutionary movement and the interests of the Soviet Union as a state had come into direct and flagrant contradiction and that one set of interests had to be subordinated to the other. This has happened frequently in the past and the reso-

¹ Cf. V. V. Aspaturian, "Dialectics and Duplicity in Soviet Diplomacy," *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 1, 1963, pp. 42-58, and "Diplomacy in the Mirror of Soviet Scholarship," in J. Keep, editor, *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror* (New York: Frederick C. Praeger, Inc., 1965), pp. 243-274.

lution has nearly always been in favor of Soviet state interests, but what makes this particular action unique is that the Soviet leaders were unable credibly to correlate and identify their state interests with an ideological interest in a way to persuade perhaps the overwhelming majority of Communists throughout the world.²

Even Fidel Castro was moved to concede that the Soviet action was illegal, immoral and contrary to basic Communist precepts, although he supported it on grounds of Cuban self-interest. Significantly, support for the Soviet action, tacit or open, came only from those states (Communist and non-Communist) and Communist parties that perceived their self-interest to be more in tune with Soviet self-interest than in conflict.

CHANGING SOVIET ROLE

When the Soviet Union established its sphere of influence in East Europe after World War II, Soviet state interests and ideological interests were conveniently and logically in tandem. The establishment of a Soviet bloc simultaneously satisfied the historic and strategic necessity of a security belt and the convenience of a springboard for the further communization of Europe in accordance with the self-imposed mission assumed by Moscow.

Increasingly, however, these two purposes of the Soviet presence in East Europe have been rendered incompatible and, as the Soviet role and position in the international Communist movement have been challenged from within and eroded by obstacles and hazards from without, the U.S.S.R. has been forced to reexamine the basic premises of its presence in East Europe. By resorting to the military occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leaders have signified their determination to

maintain a sphere of influence in the traditional great power sense and have thereby implied that the East European countries, for all practical purposes, can no longer serve as a springboard for the further communization of Europe. This signifies the full flowering of the Soviet state as a traditional imperialist state, whose influence and role in the world are determined not by the attractiveness of its ideology but by the enormity of its power and its determination to employ it in its self-interest.

A decade ago, in the eyes of most Americans, East Europe had been reduced to little more than an amorphous grey blob destined to languish as a permanent appendage to the Soviet Union. Some 60 million people divided among more than half-a-dozen nationalities seemed suddenly and irrevocably to have been stripped of their proud histories, deprived of their national identities and shorn of their cultural individualities. They became part of an expanding Soviet or Communist empire. With almost indecent unanimity, the outside world forgot their national identities and for more than a decade they were almost universally consigned to anonymous oblivion as Soviet "satellites," or vassal states.

When Josef Stalin died in March, 1953, the dominance of the Soviet Union in the Communist system appeared fixed and permanent and the primacy of its interests established and assured. Stalin's death, however, unleashed internal divisions among his successors and this created opportunities for other Communist states to stir and come back to life. In satellite capitals, amorphous factional groupings took shape corresponding to those in the Kremlin. The more inconclusive the struggle in Moscow, the greater the apprehension in East Europe. Stalin was dead and Stalinism was dying. The Communist world entered into a period of turmoil and confusion. Direction from Moscow became contradictory, inconsistent, wavering and hesitant.

While it was Tito's defection in 1948 that pointed the way and Stalin's death in 1953 that created the opportunity, it was the

² For a fuller treatment of the author's view of this point, cf. the following: "Soviet Foreign Policy," in R. C. Macridis, *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., third edition, 1967); "Moscow's Foreign Policy," *Survey*, October, 1967, pp. 35-60; "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet System," R. B. Farrell, editor, *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966) pp. 212-287.

denunciation of Stalin by Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1956 at the twentieth party congress that gave initial impetus to pluralistic communism. It was the Sino-Soviet split, the detente with the United States (as a consequence of the partial nuclear test ban treaty signed in July, 1963), and Khrushchev's sudden and unceremonious ouster in October, 1964, that created new opportunities and successively accelerated the fragmentation of the Communist bloc and the liberalization of internal regimes. The Sino-Soviet conflict enabled the smaller states of East Europe to play off the Communist giants against one another and thus afforded them the opportunity to develop greater autonomy within the Communist movement as both Peking and Moscow bid for their favor and support. First Albania succeeded in using China to separate herself from Soviet paternalism and then Rumania offered herself as a "neutral" mediator between Russia and China while simultaneously enlarging her own freedom of action.

GREATER INTERNAL AUTONOMY

As the East European states continued to assert the priority of their own national interests in one area after another in their dealings with the U.S.S.R., individual states demanded and received greater internal autonomy. Soviet-modeled institutions were, in many cases, dissolved or modified; Soviet-type ideological controls over the arts, sciences, professions, education and information media were relaxed in accordance with the local demands of each state; and the Cominform itself was abolished in response to these demands.

The expansion of internal autonomy spilled out into the realm of foreign policy when, in April, 1964, Rumania announced what amounted to a virtual declaration of independence, with her leaders refusing to sub-

ordinate their economic development to the central coordination and planning of the bloc's Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and supinely to accept its dictate that Rumania concentrate on agricultural development and spurn industrialization.³

Khrushchev's ouster in October, 1964, accelerated the erosion of Soviet influence, and in the following year Rumania refused to accept a Soviet demand that all the Warsaw Pact countries adopt uniform rules on military conscription and instead reduced the military obligation of her conscriptees to below the suggested level. In 1966, Rumania issued her first independent call for the dissolution of all military blocs and in the same year demanded that Moscow not employ nuclear weapons without consulting the other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. At the same time, Rumania questioned the right of Moscow to select the commander of the Warsaw Treaty forces and suggested that it be rotated among the other members.⁴ The same year saw Rumania concluding a number of important commercial arrangements with Western countries which reduced her trade with the Soviet Union to about 30 per cent of the total by 1968, thus further reducing Moscow's capability to take punitive action.

Beginning in 1964 and continuing to the present, the Rumanian leaders refused to condemn Red China and to side with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet split and adopted a policy of pursuing friendly relations with *all* countries, including the United States. In apparent pursuance of this policy, Rumania has served as a diplomatic conduit between the United States and North Vietnam, has established normal diplomatic relations with West Germany, has refused to condemn Israel as the aggressor in the June, 1967, Arab-Israeli war and has continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel while also voting independently of the Soviet bloc on a number of issues in the U.N.

During the first half of 1968, Rumania's defiance of the Soviet Union accelerated and was no doubt encouraged by developments

³ Cf. D. Floyd, *Rumania, Russia's Dissident Ally* (New York: Frederick C. Praeger, Inc., 1965), and Ghita Ionescu, *The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965).

⁴ Cf. Excerpts from Ceausescu's speech in *The New York Times*, March 14, 1966.

in Czechoslovakia. As the Czechs expanded their area of internal freedom, Rumania expanded hers in foreign policy and the two processes appeared to feed on one another. Rumania firmly refused to take part in the Budapest Consultative Conference of Communist Parties (March 1, 1968) and a week later at the Sofia meeting of the Warsaw Pact powers, she refused to sign the "unanimous" declaration endorsing the draft treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons sponsored by the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

This was followed by Rumania's refusal to participate in the Dresden Conference of Warsaw Powers and its crude threat to intervene in Czechoslovakia (March 23-24, 1968). She similarly refused to participate in the Warsaw meeting of the alliance (Czechoslovakia also refused to attend) on July 14-15, 1968, which issued an even more threatening ultimatum to Dubcek's Czech regime. During this period, Rumanian leaders publicly encouraged the Czech reformers and at the height of the crisis, Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu offered to lend his personal presence in Prague in a joint gesture of defiance. Czech party leader Alexander Dubcek prudently declined the offer, but after the Cierna and Bratislava meetings with the Soviet leadership, Ceausescu followed Yugoslav President Tito to Prague in a display of solidarity. To the Soviet Union, it might seem that the pre-1939 Little Entente was being resurrected as a hostile grouping of Communist states in its erstwhile placid garden of client and vassal states. After the Soviet intervention, Rumania continued her gestures of defiance: she condemned the invasion; demanded that all Communist states

be masters of their own affairs; vowed never to allow Warsaw Pact forces on Rumanian territory; placed the entire country on the alert and threatened to resist actively any possible Soviet encroachment on her sovereignty.

REASONS FOR INTERVENTION

At what point in such defiance are Soviet leaders apt to intervene? Does the Soviet armed intervention provide clear-cut criteria for judging what might be called the Soviet "threshold of intolerance"? On the surface, it might appear that the threshold of intolerance in the Czechoslovak case was reached at a point somewhere between "modern revisionism" and "social democracy," and that a precedent for future interventions has thus been established. In concrete terms, the Czechoslovak intervention suggests that the Soviet Union may intervene when:

1. All censorship, restraints and sanctions on freedom of expression in the press, arts, and sciences are removed and freedom of expression and assembly are generally restored;⁵

2. Pressures develop for the restoration of a multiparty system that would jeopardize the political monopoly and control of the Communist party;⁶

3. Economic innovations are planned that would seriously dilute the "Socialist" character of the economic order, returning some sectors of the economy to private hands and allowing a greater latitude for further expansion of the private sector;

4. Parliamentary government—whose power, responsibility and accountability would be to the electorate rather than the Communist party—is restored.

In Czechoslovakia, such internal policy changes were not sufficient in themselves to provoke Soviet intervention, given the grave risks and costs that such intervention would entail. If changes could have been *contained* and *restricted* to Czechoslovakia, then intervention might have been averted. It appears that it was precisely this assurance that Dubcek and his reformist colleagues gave and which the Soviet leaders initially accepted. Upon further reflection, however, it was judged that Dubcek was either unwilling or unable to control the situation at home and

⁵ For the ventilation of Soviet fears concerning freedom in Czechoslovakia, cf. Yuri Zhukov, "Strange Undertaking of *Obrana Lidu*," *Pravda*, July 27, 1968, and "Double Game," *Pravda*, July 28, 1968. For Soviet attacks on Czech "revisions" of recent history, cf. A. Nedorov, "Contrary to the Facts," *Izvestia*, June 29, 1968, and "What Does 'The Student' Teach?—The Prague Weekly 'for Young Intelligentsia' and Its Concept of Democracy," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 21, 1968.

⁶ This was reflected in the vicious Soviet attacks upon the political manifesto, "2000 Words," which called upon the Dubcek regime to purge the Party of Novotny followers, and contained a savage criticism of the Party as the source of Prague's ills for the past 20 years.

was certainly unable to prevent the contagion of liberalization from spreading across the Czech frontiers.⁷

Another major risk in allowing internal autonomy is that it might create pressures for far greater independence in foreign policy.

Some movements in the direction of an independent Czechoslovak foreign policy raised apprehensions in Moscow, frightened Polish Premier Wladyslaw Gomulka and appeared downright ominous to East German party leader Walter Ulbricht. These included not only a possible political and diplomatic rapprochement with West Germany (encouraged by Bonn's repudiation of the Munich agreement of 1938) originating within the Dubcek regime, but also the prospect of a large hard-currency loan from West Germany that might set the stage for a radical reorientation of Czechoslovakia's trade from the Soviet Union and East Europe to Western countries.⁸ The fact that such a rearrangement of trade relations coincided with Czech economic interests and was indispensable for economic recovery served to reinforce the Soviet fear that a change in trade relations would soon be followed by significant alterations in Czechoslovakia's political and ideological alignments.

Furthermore, when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's mission to save Czech Premier Antonin Novotny failed in December, 1967, and particularly after Novotny's suspension from the party and the discrediting of the secret police by the Dubcek regime, Czech opinion on foreign policy became bolder and—from the Soviet point of view—outrageous. A prominent Czech general challenged Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact command structure;⁹ others called for a reexamination of Czechoslovakia's role in the Warsaw Pact Organization; while still others demanded

that future Czech foreign policy be based on Czech national interests and not on the interests of the Soviet Union, other Communist states or the world Communist movement. Some even called for a frankly "neutralist" policy.

The decisive factor in a sharply divided Soviet leadership may well have been the real fear that Ulbricht would not be able to resist the pressures for liberalization in East Germany that would inevitably be generated if Dubcek were successful in resisting Soviet pressures. Greater internal autonomy in East Germany would inevitably result in further popular pressures for an independent reexamination of East Germany's role as a separate state bound in permanent vassalage to Russia. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union would be confronted with a crisis of incalculable magnitude. The situation might spin out of control and result in a reunited Germany that would fundamentally alter the entire balance of power in Europe and conjure up the nightmare of another German march to the East. At best, an autonomous East Germany would sap Soviet energies and constitute a permanent drain on Soviet power, resources and nerves.

One might even make out a case that the desperate and hasty disavowal of the Bratislava agreement was actually triggered not so much by Dubcek's refusal or inability to satisfy some reputed secret commitment to arrest liberalization but rather by Ulbricht's unexpected gesture of reconciliation with West Germany made soon after his disagreeable meeting with Dubcek and just a few days

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⁷ This was the crux of the warnings in the Dresden and Warsaw statements and a major reason given for the necessity of intervention in *Pravda*, August 22, 1968.

⁸ Moscow feared that not only Prague but other Eastern European states might be attracted by the blandishments of West Germany's "new Eastern Policy," which became a focus of Soviet attack.

⁹ Lt. General Vaclav Prchlik, head of the Military Department of the Central Committee of the Czech Communist Party.

Pointing out that the "old imperial principle of divide and rule" applies to Soviet policies in the Arab world, this article shows how "Russia stands to gain more by exploiting the weaknesses and the special circumstances of individual Arab states than by dealing with a stronger unified organism."

Soviet Policy in the Middle East

BY GEORGE LENCZOWSKI

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BEGINNING IN 1955, the Soviet Union undertook an offensive of rapprochement with the countries of the Middle East. This offensive was aimed primarily at the Arab states, but it encompassed also such non-Arab countries as Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. Soviet progress in the Northern Tier was slower because Turkey and Iran, mindful of Russian aggressiveness in the first postwar decade, were suspicious of Soviet motives and preferred to link themselves to the West through such multilateral instruments as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Baghdad Pact (subsequently CENTO).

In contrast, Russia scored considerable successes in the Arab world, especially between 1955 and 1957. The Soviet-Egyptian arms deal and the Suez crisis marked high points in the Soviet policy of building friendship with the Arabs. A decade later, the Arab-Israeli war and the resulting complications in Arab-Western relations provided another opportunity for the Soviet Union to increase its influence and stature in the Middle East. This time its success was even more pronounced than it was during the Suez crisis of 1956. While at that time the U.S.S.R. and the United States both ranged themselves against the combined Anglo-French and Israeli aggression, in 1967 Russia enjoyed a monopoly of pro-Arab posture.

In a more general sense, the decade of the 1960's has been characterized by intensive

Soviet penetration of the Middle East in the political, economic and cultural sectors. This penetration has been aided by a number of factors, of which the following could be identified as most significant:

- (a) putting its emphasis on peaceful coexistence, Soviet policy avoided violence and threats;
- (b) the Soviet Union displayed a marked willingness to deal with the established Middle Eastern governments regardless of their hue, while at the same time de-emphasizing its support for local Communist parties;
- (c) major efforts were made to identify Russia with Arab nationalist aspirations; the struggle against Zionism, imperialism and feudalism became standard catchwords of both the Arab and Soviet political vocabularies;
- (d) Russia was willing and able to respond to the urgent quest of Middle East governments for speedy development irrespective of the political structure of the recipient countries;
- (e) Socialist trends in some states, expressed in the expansion of the public sectors of national economies, were conducive to closer links between Russia and the Middle Eastern "clients" inasmuch as they led to an enlarged volume of government-to-government transactions;
- (f) the weakening of the United States alliance system (both NATO and CENTO) was enhancing the Soviet opportunities of penetration;
- (g) the diversion of the major American effort to the war in Vietnam weakened the relative position of the United States in the Middle East, thereby strengthening Russia's influence;
- (h) a dramatic loss of United States influence in

the Arab world on account of the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967, worked to the direct advantage of the Soviet Union.

In its policy of penetration, the U.S.S.R. was seconded by other countries of the Soviet bloc. Numerous aid-and-trade transactions and cultural cooperation agreements concluded between Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Rumania and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and the countries of the Middle East, on the other, greatly added to the overall cumulative effect.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOVIET PENETRATION

In spite of the intensity of the Soviet penetration, none of the Soviet Union's Middle Eastern partners was ever linked to it by an alliance. From the formal point of view, all Soviet transactions were conducted with governments which were either neutralist (most of the Arab states and Afghanistan) or allied to the West (Turkey and Iran). However, behind the facade of formal neutralism, certain Arab countries, most notably the United Arab Republic, were in fact rather closely aligned with the Soviet Union on most major issues of foreign policy. An attempt to measure the intensity of Soviet penetration might, therefore, lead to the following tentative categorization in a descending order from high to low:

1. political ties and arms aid (the U.A.R., Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen);
2. political ties and economic assistance (the U.A.R., Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen);
3. economic assistance but no political ties (Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey);
4. arms aid but no political ties (Iran, Sudan).

Some clarification of the terms used here may be in order. "Economic assistance" embraces a wide spectrum of transactions which may include cash credits, long-range loans at a low interest rate, direct Soviet participation in major construction projects and barter agreements. Soviet preference has generally been to assist, through direct participation, in major—sometimes monumental—works, such as big river dams, steel plants and similar basic infrastructural ventures. But occasion-

ally Russia would also undertake a major consumption project provided it had a proper publicity value (such as paving streets in Kabul). Generally, Soviet economic assistance has tended to be directed toward industrial objectives, but agriculture has not been altogether neglected, as evidenced by Soviet aid in erecting silos in Iran and regulating certain rivers. In recent years, i.e., beginning with the mid-1960's, Russia began modest expansion in the oil sector by concluding exploration or pipeline construction contracts with such countries as Iran, Syria and Iraq.

The term "arms aid" similarly embraces a variety of transactions ranging from barter deals (arms for cotton in Egypt), through other forms of payment to outright grants. Both the economic assistance and the arms aid have involved the participation of Soviet experts—civil and military. Scant information about the activities of these technicians and officers seems to indicate that their contacts with local populations are restricted to the transaction of essential business with their opposite numbers; that there is little or no socializing; and that they have not been caught engaging in any obvious propaganda or indoctrination activity. In fact, it would appear that the relative isolation of these Soviet-imported communities (experts are sometimes accompanied by their families) has been imposed upon them by Soviet authorities out of fear of having them "contaminated" by the "bourgeois" ways and thinking still prevalent even among the Socialist bureaucrats of certain recipient countries.

On the military side, "arms aid" should also be understood to encompass the training of Middle Eastern, particularly Arab, officers in the use of more sophisticated weaponry in Russia or the Soviet satellite states. The most pronounced type of military assistance is in the form of Soviet airplanes and pilots, units of the Soviet navy, or crews handling missile sites in the recipient countries. Thus far, there has been no firm evidence of the Russians or satellite nationals having shared in actual military operations, in spite of the

rumors about the activity of Soviet pilots in the civil war in Yemen.

Soviet "cultural" penetration may be regarded almost as a misnomer because there has really been no significant export of Soviet proletarian culture to the countries of the Middle East. What little activity there is has usually taken two forms: it has consisted either in sponsoring occasional lectures, concerts and art exhibits by Soviet scholars and artists (with fairly negligible impact on the target groups in the Middle East), or in making scholarships available for Middle Eastern students in Russia and the Soviet bloc countries. Regardless of country or social class, Arabs, Iranians and Turks still prefer United States or European films, books and illustrated magazines (if admitted by local censorship). By the same token, young girls in those countries follow "decadent" patterns of miniskirts, bikinis, lipstick and discotheque addiction rather than the models set by squat, hard working and drably dressed Soviet women.

In contrast, scholarships offered by Soviet and East European institutions of higher learning make an impact upon the education—particularly technical—of substantial numbers of young men, especially from Arab countries. There is no conclusive evidence that such educational experience in the Eastern bloc has resulted in massive conversions to Communist ideology. In fact, there is some evidence of the opposite result. For example, Iraqi students studying engineering in Odessa protested to the Iraqi embassy in Moscow against the attempt to introduce into their curriculum a course on the history of the Communist party of the Soviet Union as irrelevant to their academic objectives and as a possible device of indoctrination. As a result, Soviet authorities abandoned the idea.

It would be obviously improper to disregard the presence of the local Communist parties in the Arab countries and in Iran. Generally outlawed, they tend to operate in secrecy but in some cases, notably in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, they have (depending on the period and the circumstances) operated almost openly. However, their existence

antedates the intensive Soviet policy of penetration and their fortunes are not invariably linked with the success of Russian dealings with the established governments. In fact, sometimes closer government-to-government relations have had an adverse effect on the growth of the local Communist movements. Perhaps the closest point to real ideological penetration has occurred when the ruling parties of Russia and Syria (i.e. the C.P.S.U. and the Ba'ath) have organized mutual visits of their representative groups to discuss their ideological and organizational problems. It is not unlikely that in a dialogue of this sort the discovered similarity of approaches of the two parties on a number of issues might result in a greater tolerance toward communism on the part of the Ba'ath, although again firm evidence on this matter is lacking.

U.S.S.R. AND TURKEY AND IRAN

Between 1966 and 1968, relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey and Iran showed a marked improvement. Not only were previous threats and hostile propaganda campaigns abandoned, but many positive steps were taken. While a detente and cooperation were characteristic of the new Soviet policy toward both southern neighbors, major successes could be registered particularly in Soviet dealings with Iran. In 1966 a comprehensive Soviet-Iranian agreement provided for Soviet assistance in erecting a steel plant and a metallurgical complex in the vicinity of Isfahan, a provincial capital located in the center of Iran, remote from the traditional sphere of Russian influence in the north. The agreement also pledged Soviet assistance in the construction of grain elevators throughout Iran, joint regulation of the border rivers of Aras and Atrak, and aid in a number of other industrial projects. Payment for the steel plant was to be effected by supplies of natural gas from Iran's southern oil fields, which in turn would be conveyed to the Soviet Union's Caucasian border by a pipeline to be constructed partly by Iran and partly by the Soviet Union.

Hand-in-hand with this basic agreement went complementary deals concluded with

Rumania (Iranian oil for a \$131-million tractor factory to be built in Tabriz), Czechoslovakia (a \$100-million generator factory to be constructed by Skoda works), and other East European countries, generally providing for barter-type transactions. Furthermore, for the first time since the abortive attempt in 1946, the Soviet Union made its entry into the Iranian oil sector. On April 15, 1967, the National Iranian Oil Company and the U.S.S.R. reached an agreement giving the Soviet Union the right to explore and drill for oil in certain areas outside the territory exploited by the Western-owned consortium.

An interesting innovation in Soviet-Iranian relations was the conclusion, on February 9, 1967, of an arms agreement worth \$110 million. Russia undertook to provide armored troop carriers, trucks and anti-aircraft guns in exchange for light goods. This was the first time that a country linked to a Western defense system became a recipient of Soviet military equipment. This agreement was symbolic of gradual Iranian emancipation from the United States-sponsored system of political and military guarantees. It was based on the conviction of Iran's ruling group that strict ties with the West should be relaxed inasmuch as the Soviet Union ceased to present an immediate threat to Iran. This view of the Soviet Union stemmed from the Iranian evaluation of Soviet internal changes since Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and Soviet preoccupation with China. Thus, Iranian policy underwent a modification: it began stressing the economic aspects of CENTO while playing down the military, without, however, repudiating the alliance in any formal way. This new mood in Soviet-Iranian relations was enhanced by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's visit to Iran in April, 1968, to be followed by the state visit of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the Soviet Union in September.

Similarly, Turkish-Soviet relations took a friendlier turn after 1966, partly because Turkish appraisal of the Soviet reality and motives coincided with the Iranian and partly as a reaction to the much-criticized American neutrality in the Turkish-Greek conflict over

Cyprus. Kosygin's visit to Ankara in December, 1966, the signing of border settlement protocols and economic cooperation agreements, and the return visit of Turkish Premier Suleiman Demirel in Russia in September, 1967, marked the steps in the normalization of Turkish-Soviet relations. Commenting on his visit to Moscow upon his return, Demirel stated that "the traces of hostility" in their mutual relations have been eliminated. Not unlike Iran, Turkey maintained her alliance ties with the West through NATO, CENTO, and the bilateral security agreement with the United States. However, the presence of a sizable American military establishment on Turkish soil caused certain anti-American manifestations in the summer of 1968, thus further strengthening the lingering neutralist trends to Russia's implicit advantage.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD

Soviet relations with the Arabs have to some extent been conditioned by the nature of the Arab political systems. Thus, invariably, Russia would maintain closer and more friendly relations with the states of the Arab revolutionary camp (the U.A.R., Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Republican Yemen, and more recently the People's Republic of South Yemen) than with the right-wing monarchies or such "neutrals" as Lebanon, Tunisia and Sudan. It should be pointed out, however, that the political conservatism or monarchical structure of certain Arab states have not, *per se*, deterred the Soviet Union from maintaining or seeking to maintain diplomatic and economic relations with them. The Soviet Union has embassies in Jordan, Kuwait, Libya and Morocco. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has thus far been the only Arab state steadfastly refusing to open diplomatic relations with Moscow despite the latter's informal solicitations.

Soviet transactions with the "neutral" Arab camp (in terms of inter-Arab alignments) have varied from trade relations with Lebanon, through cultural relations with the guided democracy of Tunisia (the June 22,

1967, agreement), to arms aid to Sudan (the September, 1967, negotiations in Khartoum).

The main thrust of Soviet endeavors, however, has been directed toward the cementing of political friendship with the Arab military dictatorships born of coups and revolutions. Egypt has been the principal target since the 1955 so-called Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal (later publicly acknowledged to represent a Soviet-Egyptian agreement) and U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's attack against the Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact. Soviet diplomatic support to Cairo during the Suez crisis coupled with the undertaking to build the high Aswan Dam constituted the highlights of Russia's politico-economic offensive. From that time on, Soviet ties with Egypt, through arms supplies, barter deals and support of various development projects, have been steadily maintained and strengthened. Because of the firm grip of Nasser's government on the domestic situation, this close friendship with Russia and the Soviet bloc did not result in the growth of communism in Egypt. But the prestige accruing to the Soviet Union through its dealings with a leading Arab nationalist country did have an encouraging effect on the growth and influence of Communist movements in other countries of the revolutionary camp, especially Syria and Iraq and, to some extent, in Jordan as well.

Egypt's ambitious development programs together with her militant Pan-Arab policy and experimentation with socialism produced serious economic strains and an unceasing need for foreign economic assistance. Although Egypt (later the U.A.R.) did not limit her search for aid and credits to the Soviet bloc and availed herself both of United States surplus food assistance and West European credits, her main provider was the U.S.S.R. This in turn created a degree of Egyptian dependence on the Soviet Union—economic, technical, military and ultimately political—which to a large extent contradicted Nasser's claim of having achieved the full emancipation of his country from foreign control. It would be more accurate to say that Egypt freed herself politically from the

remnants of British tutelage to fall under an increasing Soviet influence.

This influence was particularly enhanced as a result of the June, 1967, war. The destruction of the U.A.R. army, together with its equipment and most of its airplanes, opened the floodgate to massive Soviet arms supplies. Egypt not only became a target for Soviet penetration but began playing an ever-increasing role as a transit route and staging point for Soviet ventures in Yemen, South Arabia and Africa. While thus reaping political benefits from the crisis of 1967, the Soviet Union suffered also the inconvenience of being denied (along with other nations) the use of the Suez Canal. In purely strategic terms due to the war in Vietnam, the continuous passage through the canal would probably benefit the Soviet Union more than the United States and its Western allies.

Substantial Soviet effort was also exerted in Syria after 1957 and in Iraq after the revolution of 1958. In both cases, Russia undertook to supply quantities of arms and to assist in a variety of development projects. Economic and technical penetration of Syria by the Soviet bloc countries was especially noticeable. An oil refinery at Homs was constructed by a Czechoslovak firm in the late 1950's, while in 1967 Russia undertook to assist in the development of Syrian oilfields in the Jezira province (Karachuk and Rumaylan). Even more important was the agreement reached on December 27, 1967, whereby the Soviet Union undertook to supervise the construction of the Euphrates Dam. In contrast to Egypt, this cordiality in Soviet-Syrian relations was partly reflected in the more favorable treatment accorded to Syria's domestic Communists. In 1967, Syria's leading Communist, Khaled Bakdash, was not only allowed to return from exile in the Soviet Union but also to make public statements and grant press interviews. By the same token, there were two members of Syria's cabinet in 1967 who were regarded as members of—or closely affiliated with—Syria's Communist party. A brief visit to Damascus paid in July, 1967, by Soviet President N. V. Pod-

gorny was indicative of the Soviet desire to take full advantage of Syria's pro-Soviet and anti-American mood in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war.

Soviet endeavors in Iraq have followed a similar pattern. Assisted by its European satellites, the Soviet Union concluded with Iraq a number of economic, cultural and arms aid agreements, including an oil agreement of December, 1967. In spite of these similarities, however, Iraqi-Soviet relations differed in five important respects from the Soviet-Syrian pattern:

- (a) the excesses committed by the overconfident Iraqi Communist party during the era of Abdul Karim Kassim in 1959 alienated many hitherto vacillating elements from communism and, implicitly, from Moscow;
- (b) the Soviet Union did not undertake in Iraq a project of a magnitude comparable to the Aswan or Euphrates Dams;
- (c) Iraq's economy continued to have a close relationship to the West through the revenues derived from the operations of the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company;
- (d) the Kurdish problem in the north of Iraq, with an ever-present possibility of interference by outside powers (including Russia) added another note of caution to Iraqi-Soviet relations;
- (e) the Damascus maverick regime of left-wing Ba'ath (since February, 1966) has effectively isolated Syria from the West and from the Arab community of nations, thus inevitably drawing the country toward close ties with the Soviet bloc; except for a period of Kassim's regime (1958-1959) no such isolation has occurred in Iraq's relationship with the non-Communist and Arab nations.

Soviet relations with Algeria and Republican Yemen followed the lines broadly traced in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The same political vocabulary of common struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction was used, and similar offers of economic and arms aid were made and accepted. It is doubtful whether the Soviet Union could ever count on a position of near-monopoly of influence in Algeria as it did in Egypt and Syria because of Algeria's close economic involvement with France. As for Yemen, Soviet penetration was intensified by the withdrawal of U.A.R. troops from Yemeni

territory following the debacle in the June war in Sinai and the subsequent Saudi-Egyptian agreement (at the end of August, 1967). Soviet equipment and military advisers began increasingly to fill the gap left by the U.A.R. evacuation; their presence in Yemen has probably been a major factor in preventing the collapse of the Republican regime under a renewed tribal-royalist offensive.

The Arab revolutionary camp has been identified with the slogans of Arab unity. Aware of the emotional impact of such slogans upon the Arab masses, the Soviet Union has generally paid lip service to the idea of Arab unity. Thus, in November, 1966, when Syria and the U.A.R. concluded a military cooperation pact, Soviet official comments spoke favorably of the "unity of progressive forces" in the Arab world. In reality, it is doubtful whether the U.S.S.R. really desired Arab unity. In fact, it gave indications of opposing it. In February, 1958, when Syria's last parliament voted for union with Egypt, the only Communist deputy, Khaled Bakdash, cast a dissenting vote, went into hiding, and eventually appeared in Moscow to remain in exile until 1967. There is no reason to think that the old imperial principle of divide and rule does not apply to Soviet policies in the Arab world as well. Profiting from the natural tendency toward Arab revolutionary polycentrism, the U.S.S.R. stands to gain more by exploiting the weaknesses and the special circumstances of individual Arab states than by dealing with a stronger unified organism.

RUSSIA AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The essentials of the Arab-Israeli relationship have favored the Soviet position from the outset. In November, 1947, the Soviet Union cast its vote in the United Nations for the partition of Palestine, because the existence of a Jewish state in the midst of a hostile Arab world would inevitably provide a constant irritant in Arab-Western relations. The Soviet policy was not limited to voting in favor of the creation of Israel; it materially contributed to the entrenchment of Israel's

independence by providing her—through clandestine channels—with arms during her war with the Arabs in 1948. By the same token, the U.S.S.R. was one of the first major powers to extend recognition to Israel within hours of the proclamation of her independence.

Assured that Israel was there to stay, the Soviet Union promptly aligned itself on the side of the Arabs, invariably supporting Arab nationalist aspirations, but never formally endorsing repeated Arab calls for the annihilation of the state of Israel.

The Soviet Union played a significant role in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. In the first place, it may be asserted that it had materially contributed to the outbreak of the conflict in two ways: (a) by heavily arming the U.A.R. and Syria and thus assisting in the growth of exaggerated self-confidence of the military rulers in Cairo and in Damascus; (b) by warning Syria of an impending Israeli invasion on the eve of the war, and thus setting in motion a politico-military chain reaction leading to U.A.R. President Nasser's expulsion of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the U.A.R.'s territory.

Once the war broke out, Soviet support to the Arab states was limited to verbal attacks against Israel. Soviet political leadership clearly resolved to avoid direct involvement and a possibility of armed confrontation with the United States; neither Nasser nor Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol would be permitted to choose for the Soviet Union the time and place of a third world war. However, the Russians did their utmost to give verbal support to the Arabs. In the U.N. debates, they were at one with the Arab delegations in ignoring the elements of provocation supplied by Nasser's removal of UNEF from Sinai and by his announced blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. In fact, they made massive use of the U.N. deliberations to give maximum publicity to their pro-Arab stand and to contrast it with the timid and vacillating policies of the United States. To give an even greater effect to this strategy, Premier Kosygin appeared personally in the United Nations, while, simultaneously, President

Podgorny paid visits to Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad. Personal involvement in this matter of the highest Soviet office-holders testified to the importance attached to the Middle East in Soviet global strategy.

American press comments on Soviet policies at that time inclined toward oversimplified optimism by dwelling on two facts: (a) that the Soviet Union's prestige had suffered because its arms supplied to the Arabs proved of no avail in the contest with the Israelis; (b) that it suffered a political defeat by having its strongly pro-Arab motion rejected by the U.N. General Assembly. In the light of subsequent developments, these opinions appear unwarranted. Soviet proposals in the U.N. were made not for the purpose of being accepted by the majority (which the Soviet delegation knew was unrealistic), but with an eye to the maximum publicity advantage to be derived from their one-sided tenor. As for the defeat of Soviet arms, it was not the arms but the Egyptians and Syrians using them who were defeated.

This was not inconsistent with long-range Soviet policy objectives in the region. It created among the Arabs a sense of deep frustration coupled with a sense of alienation from the United States and invariably drove many of them into the proffered Soviet embrace. Furthermore, Russia immediately offered to—and did—replace most of the destroyed weapons, equipment and planes with new ones. At the same time, the Arab governments were offered critical suggestions from Moscow on how to replace their officer corps by a new one whose social origins would assure a greater class harmony with ordinary soldiers. Another lesson to be learned by the Arabs was that to use the new weapons effectively, they would have to rely more completely on expert Soviet advice.

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George Lenczowski is a frequent visitor to the Middle East. His most recent trip to that area was made this past summer to Saudi Arabia. He is the author of *The Middle East in World Affairs* (3d ed.; Cornell University Press, 1962).

Discussing possible Soviet moves in Southeast Asia, this author points to "a budding Soviet concern over a two-front threat that may be posed by Red China and West Germany in the not-too-distant future."

Soviet Russia and Southeast Asia

By JOHN R. THOMAS

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THE CURRENT SOVIET involvement in Southeast Asia has been in part voluntary and in part the result of developments beyond Soviet control—shaped in the main by events in Vietnam. What started out primarily as voluntary involvement based on the ideological imperative of supporting the "national liberation" war in Vietnam has been transformed largely into a great-power goal of expanding the Soviet role in Southeast Asia. The original Soviet intention of advancing the world Communist cause has acquired a new objective: forcing the United States off the Asiatic mainland and thwarting what the Soviets describe as Red China's imperialist ambitions.

In Josef Stalin's time, Southeast Asia was virtually ignored because of Stalin's concentration on consolidating the Soviet hold on East Europe and arranging a favorable position for the Soviets elsewhere in Asia, particularly in China.

The relative neglect of Southeast Asia by the Soviets in the early post-World War II years was further encouraged by Stalin's ideologically rigid bipolar view of the world: those who were not completely and without deviation on the side of the Soviets were, in Stalin's view, against them. By definition this meant not only the explicit enemy—the capitalist nations in North America and Europe—but also their "lackeys" in the third world, the newly-emerging nations. Thus Stalin's view militated against any Soviet policy in Southeast Asia except one of subverting the

non-Communist regimes in the area. In contrast, Nikita Khrushchev reversed Stalin's policy and made possible a positive approach, trying to gain Soviet influence in Southeast Asia, including an influence on the indigenous non-Communist regimes. The Soviet effort took the form of economic assistance to some of the countries in the area, e.g., Burma and Indonesia, and political espousal of their imagined or justified grievances in those cases in which they were, in Soviet terms, "fighting to throw off the last remnants of colonial rule."

In Khrushchev's early days, the Soviet objective was unidimensional: to expel the West or to reduce its influence in Southeast Asia. But with the rise of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Soviet policy in the underdeveloped world has acquired another dimension: to undermine Red China's rivalry and thwart her ambitions. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia, where the Soviet Union is tempted to meddle in Red China's "backyard" in partial retribution for Chinese intrusion in East Europe—the Soviet backyard. The Soviets have not forgotten Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's "mediation" during the 1956 unrest in East Europe and the subsequent Chinese encouragement of the East European nations—e.g., Albania and Rumania—to break from the Soviet fold. (The Chinese have even tried to exploit the Soviet Union's current problems with Czechoslovakia.)

Hence, after virtual neglect of Southeast Asia under Stalin, the Soviet Union acquired

a new interest in the area under Khrushchev. This interest flagged momentarily during Khrushchev's final months in power. Because of Soviet setbacks in mobilizing the Asian Communist parties against Red China, in mid-1964 Khrushchev was in the process of writing off a Soviet role in Southeast Asia. This applied to North Vietnam in particular, which seemed to be adhering to Red China's strategy of armed struggle instead of the less violent parliamentary route advocated by the Soviets.

After Khrushchev's ouster, the new Soviet leadership reversed Khrushchev's policy of writing off Vietnam and revived Soviet interest in the area. The current Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia seems out of proportion to the intrinsic worth of Southeast Asia to the Soviets in comparison with their interests elsewhere, particularly in Europe.¹

CHANGED PERSPECTIVE

This seeming paradox of heavy involvement in a relatively peripheral area is accounted for by the fact that Soviet policy toward Southeast Asia is increasingly being shaped by a changed perspective. Two factors account for the change. Nuclear technology has made the unbridled use of force—including unrestrained Soviet support of "national

liberation" wars—dangerous to the Soviets, despite the vast increase in Soviet military might. Second, the centrifugal forces of nationalism have proven stronger than the common ideology the Soviets hoped would enable them to unite and lead all "oppressed peoples." These developments have led the Soviet Union to behave increasingly like a traditional great power.²

Other events have given impetus to such a great power policy. The Soviets believe that the Vietnamese conflict has made the United States unpopular in Southeast Asia, insofar as the war is viewed as a United States assault on Asian nationalism. At the same time, Maoist extremism, directed in part against Southeast Asia, has alarmed Red China's neighbors. As a result, the Soviets can view Vietnam as a splendid opportunity to exploit the conflict against both the United States and Red China (as part of the great power imperative) and at the same time, to further the ideological imperative of supporting a national liberation war. North Vietnam's importance as the key to Southeast Asia has been heightened, in the Soviet view, by the decimation of the Indonesian Communist party (P.K.I.) in 1965. Until then, as the largest party in the non-Communist world, the P.K.I. seemed to offer bright prospects for a major Communist victory in Southeast Asia, far outranking even Vietnam.

But Soviet policy in Southeast Asia, like that of the United States and Red China, has run afoul of a Vietnamese conflict wider than was anticipated. Indeed, the increasing intensity and scope of the conflict, while surfacing additional opportunities for advancing Soviet influence at the expense of the United States and Red China, have at the same time posed dangers to Soviet interests. A prime danger is the possibility of a United States-Soviet confrontation either because of errors in judgment by Hanoi, the United States, or the Soviets themselves, or even because of deliberate efforts by the Chinese to embroil the Soviets in a conflict with the United States.³

Consequently, the growing importance of Vietnam to Soviet policy in Southeast Asia

¹ In February, 1966, the Soviet Politbureau member A. N. Shelepin, during a visit to Hanoi, reminded the North Vietnamese that the primary Soviet burden—and by implication Soviet interest—was in Europe. This reminder could hardly have been welcome to the North Vietnamese in the face of the escalation by the United States that included bombing North Vietnam at the very time that Shelepin was enumerating Soviet priorities. Indeed, it is most instructive that the Soviets were willing to run the risk of North Vietnamese displeasure, in the midst of fighting for influence in Hanoi against the Chinese, to make what most certainly was an unpalatable point in the eyes of Hanoi.

² For a discussion of the impact of nationalism and technology on Soviet policy, see the present author's "Technology and Nationalism" in *Survey*, October, 1967.

³ The Soviets have charged the Chinese with trying to prolong the Vietnam conflict in order to advance China's own interests. (This charge is contained, for example, in a Radio Moscow broadcast of July 24, 1968.) The Soviets have noted in this context that the Chinese interest includes war between the United States and the Soviets.

makes it essential to note not only the present Soviet attitude toward the Vietnamese conflict, but Soviet preferences for its ultimate outcome.

SOVIET EVALUATION OF PREFERRED OUTCOMES

The Soviets share with the United States and local nations in Asia—including North Vietnam—an interest in preventing Red China's domination of the Asiatic mainland. This provides the main basis for Soviet-North Vietnamese relations in Southeast Asia *vis-à-vis* Red China. Although the Soviets are equally concerned with United States policy and actions in the area, their immediate concern is centered more on the short-run threat that the United States poses to the survival of a Communist state—North Vietnam—which the Soviets are committed to defend against her overthrow by the United States. The Soviets are concerned less that in the long run the United States will be able to dominate the Asian mainland than that Red China may. Indeed, the Soviets view United States actions in Vietnam to date as a desperate attempt by the United States to retain a toehold on the Asiatic mainland.⁴

In this context, Soviet actions in Vietnam have been and in the short run will be governed by the following major considerations. Given the strategic nuclear superiority of the United States and the threat this poses to Soviet national security, the Soviet Union seeks to avoid a showdown with the United States, particularly over a peripheral area like Vietnam. At the same time, the Soviet Union wants to avert having an indigenous

Communist victory in Vietnam achieved in a way that validates Red China's strategy for winning "People's Wars." This is an important consideration: Vietnam has been made a test case in the Sino-Soviet dispute between the more cautious and gradualist Soviet approach and the more aggressive strategy advocated by the Chinese. Beyond this, the Soviet attitude on Vietnam is shaped by an overriding interest in preventing this conflict from disrupting higher Soviet priorities elsewhere, primarily in Europe. (Czechoslovak developments have increased the importance of Soviet attention in Europe.) Thus the Soviets undoubtedly wish the United States to become so involved in Vietnam that it will be too preoccupied to block the advancement of Soviet objectives elsewhere.⁵

Because of the foregoing considerations, Soviet interests would be best served by a stalemate in Vietnam that would pave the way for ultimate Communist victory. Such a situation would meet most Soviet requirements: it would avoid a further heightening of tensions in Vietnam to a point that could ultimately force heavier, direct Soviet involvement and thus risk a nuclear showdown with the United States; it would prevent a quick Communist victory (which the Soviets believe is unattainable in the near future because of the massive United States effort) that could be used by Red China to confirm her strategy of no compromise or negotiations with the United States (as opposed to strategy advocated by the Soviets); it would—because it would leave the Vietnamese embroglio temporarily unresolved—keep the United States and Red China engaged against each other and thus prevent either from directing full attention to blocking or undermining Soviet interests; it would keep open the possibility of a gradual Communist victory in Vietnam, e.g., through a coalition government, and would thus accord more closely with the Soviet-advocated nonviolent strategy than with Red China's advocacy of a solely violent approach and its risks of triggering a United States military overreaction.

In this connection, a prolonged stalemate

⁴ The Soviets believe this effort will be beyond the ultimate capability of the United States, given the geopolitical factors arrayed against it. As early as 1965, the Soviets asserted that the United States could not win in Vietnam even if it tripled its military buildup over 1965. (See *Pravda*, August 1, 1965). In effect, the Soviets question United States "staying power" in Vietnam in political terms, i.e., they doubt the United States can resist pressure to withdraw from Vietnam from public opinion at home and abroad.

⁵ Indeed, the Soviets have taken note of critics of United States policy in Vietnam who maintain that United States overinvolvement there has left it powerless to meet such Soviet moves as the crushing of liberalization in Czechoslovakia.

might see the Vietnamese Communists rely heavily, if not exclusively, on the Soviets for material assistance and (the Soviets hope) for political advice in order to achieve ultimate victory.

The Soviets have calculated that in any protracted conflict their material superiority would enable them to support the Vietnamese Communists better than the Red Chinese could with their limited resources.⁶ A stalemate in Vietnam would also presumably accord with a Soviet acquiescence to some short-run United States presence in Asia in order to distract and help contain Red China until the indigenous forces in the area—e.g., India and Japan—are strong enough to take over the containment function.⁷

At that point, the Soviets could redirect their strategy once more to their earlier articulated goal of driving the United States out of Asia. Were the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union to change in the Soviet favor, limited Chinese-United States involvement over Vietnam in a prolonged stalemated situation would also permit the Soviets to exploit the situation elsewhere for gains in Europe.⁸

⁶ During a recent trip to the Soviet Union, the present author heard a Soviet spokesman explicitly detail for a Soviet audience the material edge the Soviets had over Red China in assisting Vietnam. In the words of the spokesman, the Soviets could supply North Vietnam with the latest technology whereas the Chinese were fortunate if they could spare a few bullets and some rice, assuming they had a good crop.

⁷ Soviet actions in Asia to date already reflect their China-containment policy. For example, their mediation efforts in the India-Pakistan dispute in 1965 were directed as much to narrowing China's influence in South Asia as to taking advantage of United States inability to play the mediator role. The same can be said of recent Soviet efforts to arrange an arms deal with Pakistan.

⁸ Recent United States press reports suggest that the Soviets are making a determined effort to reach strategic parity with the United States and may already be near it. (See, e.g., *The New York Times*, February 25, 1968.)

⁹ Soviet views on the belief in a Communist victory in Vietnam were stated in "The Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in Connection With the Aggression of United States in Vietnam." (See *Pravda*, December 10, 1965.) This belief has been reiterated on numerous occasions thereafter, even in the face of escalating United States military action.

¹⁰ Robert C. North, *Moscow and Chinese Communists* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953, 1st ed.), p. 222.

HOPE FOR A STALEMATE

That the Soviets probably want a stalemate in Vietnam for the short run can be inferred from their diplomatic-political moves to date. In the last several years they attempted to influence Hanoi to negotiate with the United States, either directly or by such means as the resumption of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, with the expectations that any negotiations would be a drawn-out process and would thereby exclude a quick military victory. (The lack of any major progress in the Paris talks between the United States and North Vietnam to date confirms this expectation.)

Moreover, the Soviets speak of *ultimate* Communist victory in Vietnam as if to suggest that they, at least, are willing to wait for such a victory in the future (implicitly on their terms) rather than to press for victory that may not be achievable now, and certainly, in the face of Red China's current rivalry and influence in Hanoi, not now on terms most favorable to Soviet interests.⁹

Indeed, it is possible that the Soviets do not want an outright Communist victory in Vietnam until they can secure maximum control or influence over the local Communists. In the past, they have demonstrated their inclination to drag their feet or counsel delay in achieving Communist victories if these run counter to other objectives. This is best typified by their behavior in China in the late 1940's. At that time, the Soviets tried to delay a Maoist victory because "the objective" conditions in Soviet eyes were not ripe for a Chinese victory.¹⁰ It could be inferred, however, that Stalin did not want Mao (who had disregarded Soviet advice before) to win until he could secure greater control over Mao. The open eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960's reinforced Soviet second thoughts on the Maoist victory.

History—in the form of Soviet reluctance fully to back a Communist party fighting to gain power under conditions unfavorable to the Soviets—could repeat itself in Vietnam. Soviet reluctance could be engendered in particular if North Vietnamese President Ho

Chi Minh (who has greater freedom to call off the conflict because of his great stature both in Vietnam and in the Communist world) were replaced by a lesser figure. The latter might be unable to call a halt to the fighting, even if this seemed expedient to him and the Soviets, because of the pressure generated by "war hawks" in the Hanoi leadership. Reportedly this faction has already agitated against any negotiations because, it maintains, the last time Hanoi agreed to a bargain (in 1954), it lost at the negotiating table what it had won on the battlefield.¹¹

Then, too, Soviet reluctance to press for an immediate Communist victory in Vietnam has been engendered by its modified strategy for national liberation movements; unlike the Chinese, Soviet strategy has been modified to allow for both violent and nonviolent (the so-called "parliamentary") seizure of power by Communist groups. Therefore, a stalemate that would create political conditions for a possible victory at the polls can be justified in Soviet eyes as one route to Communist power in South Vietnam. Soviet calculations on this score are reinforced by political conditions in South Vietnam: an unpopular South Vietnamese regime—unable to carry through necessary reforms—may eventually be forced to invite Communist participation in a coalition government.

The Soviets have another perspective on the situation that goes beyond the immediate area of Vietnam. There is discernible a budding Soviet concern over a two-front threat that may be posed by Red China and West Germany in the not-too-distant future. In the Soviet view, such a threat could take the form of explicit or implicit political collusion and, in Soviet eyes, could extend ulti-

mately even to the military field. Such a threat would be particularly menacing if both Germany and China acquire sizable, or even modest, nuclear-missile capabilities. The two are already considered by the Soviets to be potential allies because both have lost territory to the Russians.¹² A radical redirection of the Soviet Union's efforts to ensure its national security interests could occur in anticipation of such a threat. There are precedents for such a change: before the Nazi attack in 1941 the Soviets concluded a neutrality pact with Japan to disarm the threat in the East; after the German onslaught, the Soviets reduced their ideological drive by closing down the *Comintern* in order to pacify the West and promote the common goal of victory over Hitler.

In the event of a two-front threat, Vietnam (whether before or after a local Communist victory) would in her own right undoubtedly play a relatively minor role in Soviet policy considerations: she does not border on the Soviet Union and would not, even if she openly joined Red China's cause, pose a direct threat to Soviet national security. A Communist-dominated Vietnam would be important symbolically (but probably no more so than other members of the Communist world) for her pro-Peking or pro-Moscow orientation. Such an orientation, however, might be highly unstable or even academic, since Vietnam has her own strong regional ambitions, e.g., against Laos and Cambodia.¹³ This undoubtedly would place her ultimately in conflict with Red China to the benefit of the Soviets. However, Vietnam's ambitions would also rivet her attention locally to Southeast Asia to Soviet detriment, since Vietnam would then be useless as a partner in any Soviet shift of any efforts from Southeast Asia to areas of higher priority.

POSSIBLE MODERATION

However, the interest of the Soviets in Vietnam may be dampened by projected developments in Southeast Asia. This could occur if the Chinese no longer make Vietnam a test case of proper strategy for national liberation movements. The Chinese could

¹¹ P. J. Honey, *Communism in North Vietnam: Its Role in the Sino-Soviet Dispute* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 5–8.

¹² *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (International Life), #10, October, 1964. For a more detailed and recent discussion of Soviet views on the Chinese threat to Soviet interests, and the German-Chinese combination, see the series by Ernst Henri, in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Literary Gazette), April 10 and 17, 1968.

¹³ Bernard K. Gordon, *Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 46–63.

be forced to moderate their own ambitions in Southeast Asia under pressure of events, e.g., successful United States military efforts in Vietnam (coupled with the danger to Red China's own security if she entered the fray) or internal changes in Peking's leadership. Such a moderation is not to be excluded as a possibility over the long run, particularly with a post-Maoist leadership. The Chinese have displayed flexibility in the past, even in situations of higher priority such as the seizure of Taiwan and the offshore islands. On several occasions they called off probes in the Taiwan Straits area after encountering a firm reaction from the United States and lack of support from the Soviet Union.¹⁴

That the Chinese have staked out a position for disengaging from Vietnam, if necessary, may be inferred from the September, 1965, declaration of Marshal Lin Piao, Red China's Defense Minister. In this, he referred to the need for self-reliance by revolutionary forces such as the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong. In this context, he implied that Vietnam should not count on foreign aid even from "Socialist countries which persist in revolution."¹⁵ This was a clear reference to the Red Chinese themselves rather than to the Soviets, inasmuch as the Chinese have accused the latter of having abandoned the revolutionary cause around

the entire globe by their revisionist policy.¹⁶

Indeed, Lin Piao's message may have been designed to anticipate possible Chinese disengagement in case the Vietcong are defeated in South Vietnam or in case North Vietnam is forced, or chooses, to make concessions at the negotiating table which are unacceptable to the Chinese.

If the Chinese—with their greater direct interest in Vietnam because she is on their doorstep—have left themselves free to disengage from the area should the need arise, then the Soviets—further removed from the area—are unlikely to back North Vietnam in a situation dangerous enough to force the Chinese to back off.

The Soviet Union's cautious behavior to date reflects its reluctance to involve itself in the Vietnamese conflict in any way that might draw down on itself the United States attention now riveted on the Chinese. This is particularly true of the Soviet military, who would bear the dangerous burden of implementing any direct and massive Soviet military involvement in Vietnam.¹⁷ To be sure, if the tide turned in the Communists' favor because the United States decided to disengage or withdraw from Southeast Asia, the Soviets would be likely to get on the bandwagon by stepping up their role in order to have some postvictory influence in Hanoi.

Alternatively, greater Soviet involvement may be triggered by any drastic changes in current United States objectives in Vietnam that would place the Soviets under severe pressure to demonstrate their basic commitment to the Communist cause. An example of a development in the Vietnamese context that could trigger a Soviet "visceral" reaction would be a United States shift from the present objective of fracturing Vietcong capabilities in the south to one of destroying and replacing the Communist regime in the north.¹⁸

(Continued on page 302)

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¹⁴ For discussion of cautious Soviet reaction that affected Chinese behavior in a crisis situation, see John R. Thomas, "The Limits of an Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," in Raymond Garthoff (ed.), *Sino-Soviet Military Relations* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1966).

¹⁵ Marshal Lin Piao, speech of September 2, 1965, quoted in Samuel B. Griffith, *Peking and People's Wars* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1966), pp. 8-9.

¹⁶ "Soviet-U.S. 'Common Interests,'" *Peking Review*, February 8, 1966, pp. 9-10.

¹⁷ For a discussion of how this key segment of the Soviet leadership views the events in Asia, see John R. Thomas, "The Soviet Military in Soviet Policy in Asia," World Outlook Section, *Washington Post*, March 6, 1966.

¹⁸ A Soviet military organ has spoken of the preservation of "national independence" of each country as one objective requiring joint action of bloc armed forces. See *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, #22, November, 1966. The events in Czechoslovakia have demonstrated once more Soviet sensitivity to threatened changes within the Communist world, even changes short of what the Soviets would perceive as an external threat to the survival of a Communist state.

After discussing a number of factors acting to effect a détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, this writer shows that "... in the long run it is ... external friction points which most seriously threaten the accommodation process. The two most obvious friction points at present are Berlin and the Middle East."

United States - Soviet Relations: The Path to Accommodation

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THE TERM "DÉTENTE" is frequently used to describe the state of United States-Soviet relations since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Harold Nicolson, the noted British diplomat, defined "détente" as simply a "relaxation of tension." The existence of a détente between two powers does not mean that fundamental problems in their relations have been solved. It does not mean that formal, or even informal, agreements have been reached between them. It in no way implies that the relaxed atmosphere is stable or permanent.

Of course, problems may be solved, agreements reached, and a stable relationship achieved during a period of détente. But if and when these things occur, it is due not to the détente itself, but to the attitudes and skills of those who direct the foreign policies of the nations in question. A détente is a starting-point for conciliation and accommodation, not the product of these processes.

The United States-Soviet détente will soon be entering its seventh year. Has any genuine accommodation taken place between the United States and the Soviet Union during this extended period of relaxation? Looking particularly at the events of the past year, a cautiously affirmative answer to this question can be suggested.

In evolving this position, five key questions should be considered. First, what are the underlying sources of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union? Second, what brought about the détente of the 1960's? Third, what factors may have impelled the two superpowers to move beyond mere détente? Fourth, what evidence is there to support the thesis that such movement indeed occurred? And fifth, what might arrest or reverse the trend toward accommodation? Some observers feel it unnecessary to devote much attention to what they feel are the obvious underlying sources of United States-Soviet tension. The cold warriors assert that the "well-known facts of aggressive Soviet expansionism" provide all the necessary explanation. The Marxist-Leninists or other representatives of the dogmatic left assert that the tension arises from the inevitable conflict of class and economic substructure. The realists see in the mere existence of two mammoth and powerful nations sufficient explanation for any and all tensions.

These extreme and oversimplified views do not do justice to the subtlety and complexity of the sources of Soviet-American tension. An adequate explanation must combine historical, economic, geo-strategic, psychological, political, and even cultural factors. Space

does not permit a full delineation of this perplexing matter, but at least a quick sketch must be attempted.

Basically, there is in the tradition of each nation a strong sense of mission. Historically, neither felt itself completely a part of the West European order from which each largely derived. Both developed a sense of uniqueness and of superiority over Europe which later became generalized into what might be called an "ideology of world ordering." As its power has grown, each nation has felt a growing obligation to influence the destiny of the rest of the world.

To this strong missionary spirit should be added an unending search for security in a world becoming increasingly insecure. Each superpower, of course, defines security in its own way. The Russians, having experienced massive land invasions—both historically and in modern times—seek security primarily through the creation of satellites and buffers capable of providing defense in depth. To this, the Soviet leadership has added a reliance on an aggressive diplomacy designed to keep potential adversaries off balance and on the defensive. Put another way, the Soviet Union seeks security by constantly challenging the status quo beyond its own sphere of influence.

For the Americans, security takes rather a different form. Whereas in the past, the United States found it in isolation and non-involvement, in this century it has swung to the opposite extreme: seeking access and influence in regions and nations far from its own territory. The United States has established an extensive system of overseas alliances and bases and has not hesitated to commit its armed forces in distant conflicts, ostensibly to avoid conflict on its own territory. American missionary zeal has tended to settle for the support of the status quo in other countries as the surest guarantee of United States security. In addition, in the post-World War II period the United States has incorporated threats of instant physical punishment or annihilation into its diplomacy, backed, of course, by the necessary weaponry. This represents a drastic innovation, but un-

fortunately it is one which has invited emulation by other powers technologically advanced enough to produce the hardware.

It is easy to see why these two modes of seeking security would produce tensions between their proponents, particularly when the international situation is as favorable for their realization as it has been. The cold war, looked at objectively, becomes a prolonged struggle between the two superpowers not so much for supremacy as for a modicum of security. In this struggle, enormous resources are continually being expended in the construction of alliance systems and in the development of ever-more-devastating systems of mass destruction.

ORIGIN OF DÉTENTE

By the early 1960's, each superpower had developed the capacity to impose "unacceptable" destruction upon the other. Although not equal in absolute destructive potential—the United States had a considerable edge—each nation's so-called "second strike capacity" was adequate to survive a surprise "first strike" by the other and to inflict a crippling retaliatory blow. A nuclear stalemate, based on mutual fear, had been reached.

Or had it? Suppose one of the two superpowers, taking advantage of the other's distaste for mutual annihilation, demanded major concessions as the price for not setting off the holocaust? Would nuclear blackmail replace nuclear stalemate?

The Cuban missile crisis of 1963 answered this question in the negative, and clearly demonstrated that the nuclear stalemate was capable of preventing one superpower from doing something the other deemed intolerable. In this crisis, a Soviet challenge to the status quo was countered by unmistakable United States willingness to use nuclear weapons to preserve a fundamental security requirement—in this case the exclusion of Soviet long-range nuclear missiles from Cuba. The Soviet leadership backed down in the crisis as soon as it perceived that its challenge was leading toward a head-on nuclear confrontation with the United States.

The Cuban crisis represented the high-point of United States-Soviet tension in the postwar period. Its resolution led swiftly to a *détente*. It is probably not quite correct to say that the crisis produced the *détente*. Rather, the crisis produced a realization in both leaderships that the only sane course was to move away from tension. President John F. Kennedy captured this very aptly in his letter to Premier Nikita Khrushchev acknowledging the latter's decision to remove the Soviet missiles from Cuba.

I think [the President wrote] that you and I, with our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, were aware that developments were reaching a point where events could have become unmanageable.¹

In "stepping back from danger" (as President Kennedy put it in the same letter) both leaderships also had an unparalleled opportunity to reassess the strategy by which they had been endeavoring to guarantee their nations' well-being and security. Out of this reassessment emerged a number of initiatives which both prolonged the new *détente* and, in all probability, began the process of a genuine accommodation.

FACTORS IMPELLING ACCOMMODATION

In the period since 1962, there have been in operation a number of factors which have forced the superpowers toward a less tense and more ordered relationship with each other. The factors were not entirely new but they were more immediate, and probably also more clearly perceived, after the crisis.

The foremost factor has been anxiety. As noted above, the Cuban crisis dramatically illustrated the dangers of nuclear confrontation—the possibility that human error or miscalculation might unleash uncontrollable forces. The logical consequence of this anxiety would be a system of arrangements designed to prevent such confrontations and to reduce the weapons-levels of the superpowers.

A second factor is the high cost of tension in economic terms. Maintenance and con-

stant up-dating of first- and second-strike nuclear capacity, together with very large conventional forces, are very expensive processes—even for superpowers. Prior to the enlarged conflict in Vietnam, the United States was spending around \$50 billion a year on defense; the Soviet figure was similar. When it becomes likely that these large expenditures are not really guaranteeing security, and may even be undermining it, reasonable leaders will seek other approaches.

A third factor has been the erosion of the bloc arrangements that had characterized the earlier postwar period. As long as the Soviet Union and the United States stood virtually unchallenged at the head of their respective ideological groupings, there was little incentive for them to compromise their differences. When subordinate nations within these groupings began to press for their own interests and to use superpower tensions for their own ends, the whole rationale of ideological confrontation became far less relevant, and the feasibility and advantages of cooperation between the two superpowers loomed much larger.

A fourth factor has been the domestic situation in each country. In the 1960's, each leadership began to be aware of serious shortcomings in its own nation's internal life. For the Americans, this had to do primarily with the problems of poverty, racial tensions, educational inadequacies, youth alienation and environmental pollution. For the Soviets, concern lay primarily in the realm of economic efficiency, with some emphasis also upon ideological liberalization. But in both cases, there was a real need for a respite from burdensome international preoccupations and a chance to concentrate upon domestic issues.

These are the main factors impelling the superpowers towards accommodation during the *détente* from 1962 to the present. The initiatives generated by these factors were not monumental, but in the aggregate they have certainly been encouraging.

THE EVIDENCE OF ACCOMMODATION

During the winter of 1962–1963, high-level bilateral talks between Soviet and American

¹ *Department of State Bulletin* (XLVII, 1220), p. 745–46.

diplomats began. One of the first concrete results of these talks was the establishment of the so-called hot-line—a direct link between Moscow and Washington which permits instant communication between the leaders in time of crisis. (The line has been used only once for this purpose, during a tense moment in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.) Another consequence of these bilateral talks, with considerably broader significance, was the multi-lateral limited Test-Ban Treaty. This instrument, signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain in Moscow on August 5, 1963, required its adherents to refrain from testing nuclear weapons in the air or under the water.²

Later that year, arrangements were made for the sale of large quantities of American wheat to the Soviet Union. The assassination of President Kennedy occurred in the middle of this important transaction, but it was consummated the following year, under President Lyndon Johnson. In 1964, the two nations signed their first bilateral treaty since Tsarist days—an agreement providing for the establishment of consular facilities in each other's major cities. Actual ratification of this treaty was, however, held up for four years. The reason for this delay was the situation in Vietnam, which has made a considerable impact upon the process of United States-Soviet accommodation.

IMPACT OF VIETNAM

The Soviet attitude towards the conflict in Vietnam is by no means clear-cut. On the one hand, support for a "fraternal Communist country" against "American imperialism" is an obligation that cannot be ignored as long as the Soviet Union has any intention whatsoever of leading the Socialist world. On the other hand, over-involvement could lead to the dreaded confrontation with the United States, and must be avoided at all costs. (President Lyndon Johnson has shown his adherence to the same viewpoint in his refusal to permit the blockading of the port of Haiphong or the bombing of Soviet supply

ships.) Although the conflict thus entails certain problems for the Soviet Union, there are also some advantages to the massive commitment of United States forces in Southeast Asia. For one thing, the United States capacity for involvement elsewhere is reduced; for another, the United States commitment tends to tie down Chinese forces which might otherwise threaten the Far Eastern portion of the Soviet Union, claim to parts of which Red China has never relinquished.

On balance, however, it seems likely that the Soviet Union will accept a negotiated settlement in Vietnam so long as it does not weaken North Vietnam and guarantees a Communist presence in South Vietnam in some form. But it is under little pressure to work for such a settlement, as its minimal role in getting the Paris peace talks going shows, and could probably sustain its present aid level to North Vietnam for a considerable period of time, assuming no drastic change in the situation. An invasion of the North would be another matter, forcing both the Chinese and the Soviets to reconsider their present strategies.

It is true that the United States escalation of the Vietnam conflict, beginning in the winter of 1964–1965, introduced a certain chilliness into Soviet-American relations. It could hardly be otherwise. However, it did not destroy the détente, nor did it end the continuing effort to discover points of mutual interest and agreement. It did not, for example, prevent President Johnson and Premier Alexei Kosygin from holding a cordial, two-day conference (June 23 and 25, 1967) in Glassboro, New Jersey, following the Premier's appearance before the United Nations General Assembly in connection with the Arab-Israeli War.

At the Glassboro Conference, Kosygin demanded United States withdrawal from Vietnam as the condition for an improvement in United States-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, in less than a month and a half, the two nations were presenting a joint draft of an anti-proliferation treaty to the 18-nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons had been a matter

² For the text, see *Current History*, October, 1965, p. 236.

of concern and discussion between them ever since the 1963 limited test ban treaty. By 1967, despite the conflict in Vietnam, both were ready to cooperate against nuclear proliferation. The treaty, if generally adopted, would prevent any increase in the present number of nuclear powers, and would bind those powers which do possess nuclear arms, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, jointly to guarantee the security of the non-possessors.

When it is remembered that these arms negotiations took place at a time when the United States was steadily increasing its bombing of North Vietnam, the Soviet Union's friend and ally, the factors impelling the two superpowers towards accommodation assume their proper proportion. The fact of the matter is that the United States and the Soviet Union simply cannot afford to let secondary considerations bar their search for better relations.

LESSONS OF 1968

During 1968, a number of events have occurred which bear out this proposition. Taking the least important first, on May 4, 1968, the Soviet parliament finally ratified the by now four-year-old consular treaty.³ Congress had ratified the treaty 14 months earlier, after considerable arm-twisting by the Administration, but the Soviet ratification had been delayed in protest over United States policy in Vietnam. Evidently, the mutual advantages of establishing consulates in a number of each others' major cities, for the purpose of expediting trade, tourism and cultural exchange, outweighed ideological arguments against the treaty, on both sides. A similar move was the inauguration on July 14, 1968, of direct commercial jet service by Soviet and American carriers between New York and Moscow, also in fulfillment of agreements reached much earlier.

A few days earlier, an event of considerably greater long-range significance had taken place. On July 1, 1968, the United States,

the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, together with 56 other nations, affixed their signatures to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.⁴ Ratification of the treaty by the superpowers and various other signers still lay ahead, perhaps very far ahead. Moreover, two important nuclear powers—France and China—did not sign the treaty, just as they had not signed the 1963 test ban treaty. Nevertheless, the signing marked an important step in the evolution of United States-Soviet relations, comparable to—perhaps even more important than—the 1963 treaty. Both powers have indicated that they would prefer a complete ban on testing, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, but both recognize that the present state of their relations, and of the world in general, precludes this. Accordingly, they have seen fit to settle for the much more modest (and certainly mutually advantageous) goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to middle-sized and small powers.

President Johnson made use of the signing ceremony of this treaty to announce agreement with the Soviet Union to commence talks “in the very near future” on limiting offensive and defensive nuclear missile systems. The subject had come up before in United States-Soviet talks, particularly with regard to the dilemma of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. Such systems would be extremely expensive—the current estimate for a full United States ABM system is \$40 billion—and are of questionable strategic value. There is no question, however, that if one superpower constructs such a system, the other would be under enormous pressure to follow suit, as was the case earlier with nuclear weapons and offensive ballistic missiles. Both countries have taken tentative steps to develop ABM systems, but could still pull back. A mutual agreement to stop or limit the race would be of immense benefit to both.

CHANCES DIM

By early fall, however, the chances of these talks succeeding seemed much less bright than they had in July. Both sides were pushing

³ For the text see *Current History*, November, 1964, p. 303.

⁴ For text see *Current History*, February, 1968, p. 107, and May, 1968, p. 305.

ahead with ABM planning and development, largely because in the interim, a crisis had occurred in Central Europe. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was unquestionably the most important event in recent United States-Soviet relations. On the night of August 20-21, Soviet armed forces, together with contingents from four other East European nations, entered Czechoslovakia for the purpose of halting the process of accelerating "liberalization" which had begun there last January. This is not the place to analyze the intricacies of the Soviet move, or its effect upon East Europe and the world Communist movement. Suffice it to say, the Soviet leadership—or at least the dominant element within that leadership—felt that the situation in Czechoslovakia was detrimental to Soviet interests.

Officially, the United States protested this action strongly and, together with Great Britain, called an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council at which the United States representative, George Ball, harshly criticized the Soviet Union. A few days later, President Johnson solemnly warned the Soviet leaders that military pressure against Rumania, another independent-minded Soviet ally, would be viewed with grave concern by the United States. These actions, however, constituted the full extent of the immediate United States response to the crisis, and it would be difficult indeed to argue that they had any real influence on the course of events leading to the precarious *modus vivendi* ultimately achieved by the valiant Czechoslovak leadership.

Thoughtful students of history will recall an earlier event remarkably similar to this Czechoslovak crisis. In April, 1965, United States troops, aided by contingents from several like-minded Latin American Allies, occupied the tiny Dominican Republic and intervened in a civil conflict then under way between forces of the left and right. Like the Soviet Union, the United States feared that a rapid deterioration of the status quo would result in a situation detrimental to its interests. The bogey of "Communist subversion" was used in much the way the Soviets used

that of "imperialist machinations" three years later in Czechoslovakia. Soviet objections to our Dominican intervention were loud and sustained, but no more effectual than United States protests about Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The parallelism of the two events can be exaggerated, but the fact remains that taken together they will illustrate the existence of mutually-recognized spheres of influence. The Soviet ambassador's secret meeting with President Johnson informing him of the incipient invasion of Czechoslovakia would never have taken place if the Soviet Union had really feared that the United States would move to thwart that invasion. Clearly, a tacit agreement exists between the two superpowers not to intervene in those regions of the world which each considers absolutely vital to its security. For the United States, this means primarily West Europe, Latin America and the Far East. For the Soviet Union, it means East Europe. Over the remainder of the globe, "competitive coexistence" (to resurrect one of Khrushchev's slogans) is the rule.

This is not to say that the American people or their government were unconcerned about the Czechoslovak episode. A sizable wave of anger and disappointment swept over the nation, significantly weakening the "peace wing" of the Democratic party and undoubtedly making it more difficult, at least in the short run, for the diplomacy of accommodation to proceed smoothly. The crisis provided powerful arguments for those Americans who fear any sort of agreement with the Soviet Union and who feel that we are truly secure only under conditions of overwhelming military superiority.

Consequently, relations will be chilly for a time. President Johnson's planned meeting with Premier Kosygin may not come off. The Senate probably will refuse to pass the Non-Proliferation Treaty this year. But the present administration has made its position quite clear: it will not use the Soviet invasion to turn the clock back. During the crisis itself, both the President and Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that they would continue working for an ABM agreement and other arms control measures. These views have

since been reiterated even more strongly. Lower-level talks will be held, and further agreements will surely be reached. The factors impelling the superpowers towards accommodation are not negated by the events in Czechoslovakia, any more than they have been (in Soviet eyes) by the conflict in Vietnam.

REMAINING FRICTION POINTS

The picture drawn thus far is an essentially optimistic one, suggesting a gradual process of accommodation within a framework of mutual restraint. In concluding, three countervailing points should be mentioned: first, that changes in the domestic political situation in either superpower could seriously endanger the process of accommodation; second, that there are still a variety of external friction points capable of reversing the process; and third, that the process itself is not necessarily in the best interests of the world community.

The full story of what happened in the Kremlin just before—and during—the Czechoslovak crisis is still not known. Clearly there was considerable dissension within the Soviet leadership over how to handle the satellite's challenge. The views of a hard-line, militarist group apparently prevailed. This could ultimately result in shifts in leadership and a revamping of Soviet foreign policy away from accommodation. Such a shift would run counter to the pressures operating upon the Soviet leadership, but the possibility should not be discounted.

The same general proposition holds for the United States. There have always been advocates of a "get-tough" policy toward the Soviet Union, both outside and inside the government. Frustration over the nation's foreign and domestic dilemmas may well enhance their influence in this crucial election year. There is, in other words, no assurance that the work of the past two administrations will be carried on into the 1970's.

However, in the long run it is probably not domestic political upheavals but external friction points which most seriously threaten the accommodation process. The two most

obvious friction points at present are Berlin and the Middle East.

The line of demarcation between Soviet and United States spheres of influence would be reasonably distinct in Europe if it were not for Berlin. Both superpowers must now rue the day they agreed to establish a four-power enclave within the Soviet zone of occupation, for this enclave developed into a virtually insoluble dilemma. The United States has committed itself to the defense of West Berlin in the most solemn terms. To allow it to fall to East Germany would be a most serious blow not only to our prestige but also to our close alliance with West Germany, the anchor of United States European policy.

On the Soviet side, continued failure to obtain control over West Berlin for East Germany prevents that ally from achieving full political consolidation and legitimization. The United States is driven to preserve the status quo at all costs; the Soviet Union to challenge it as forcefully as it dares. A new factor in this continual war of nerves is the extreme ease with which the Soviet Union occupied Czechoslovakia. Logistically, a similar lightning move could be made by the Russians against West Berlin. How would the United States react?

The Middle East presents a rather different picture, a problem of fluidity rather than an unstable status quo. Here the line of demarcation is fuzzy in the extreme. Both superpowers see the region as one of considerable economic and strategic importance. Both are active throughout the area, and have been seeking for years to increase their influence there in the wake of the receding influences of other great powers. The long-standing Arab-Israeli feud prevents the region from stabilizing in ways that would make superpower intervention more difficult. Indeed, the feud invites such intervention.

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Documenting the recent improvements in the Soviet economy, this article notes that "it is still frustrating for a Russian to look outside his country at the progress made elsewhere."

Soviet Economic Reform: Does It Still Have A Future?

BY MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN
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THE YEAR 1968 is the year of the unexpected. For a time, this referred only to the American political scene. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia it is clear that this also applies to the foreign political scene as well, particularly the U.S.S.R.

Amid such tumult, it is a bit risky to venture much of a statement about the future course of economic reform in the U.S.S.R. Nonetheless, readers and editors always seem to ask for such predictions about what will happen, and writers always seem to like to test their predictive abilities. If the predictions prove wrong, the writers can always rationalize their mistakes by repeating how risky such predictions were in the first place.

Prior to August, 1968, economic reform in the U.S.S.R. seemed to be moving along according to the original schedule announced in late 1964. Yet there were those both outside and inside the U.S.S.R. who doubted the effectiveness of what was being done. Dissatisfied with the timid pace of the reform, these critics argued that fundamental changes in the economic structure would be necessary before the reforms would produce any results. They were skeptical of what they regarded as superficial fiddling with the economy. More sanguine observers acknowledged that more could be done, but they were nonetheless impressed with what had already taken place.

¹ *Ekonomicheskaja Gazeta*, No. 36, September, 1968, p. 9.

Beginning slowly in January, 1966, with 43 enterprises, the reform continued to spread so that by September, 1968, over 25,000 firms were operating under the new conditions.¹

This meant that, as distinct from the former operating rules, firms under the new reforms are judged by whether or not they fulfill either their sales or profit plans in addition to a target expressed in terms of rate of return. This is a marked departure from the earlier system which placed prime emphasis on the fulfillment of quantitative production targets. In other words, it no longer matters how many refrigerators the factory produces. Now the main success indicator is how many rubles worth of refrigerators the factory sells, or how high the profits are, and how the profits compare with the amount of the firm's capital. These important changes have forced the plant director to pay more attention to his customer's needs, to improve the quality of his product and to increase the productivity and efficiency of his plant.

In contrast, under the old system, the manager never had to worry about whether or not there were any sales or even if there were any customers. Once an item was produced, the producer would be able to collect his premiums.

There were other equally important changes included in the new reform. As opposed to the old system, Soviet firms must now pay capital charges to the state on all

working and fixed capital they have at their disposal. Having to pay such a fee, the manager is naturally less anxious to build up the unnecessary inventory hoards which he could do before at virtually no cost to himself. Similarly, the manager must now check to see that his fixed capital equipment earns its own way. If his machinery doesn't bring a return higher than the capital charge the manager must pay the government, then the firm's profits will be reduced. Thus for the first time the manager must insure that his capital is being used effectively. Before reform this was not an especially important consideration.

Reinforcing this tendency is the decision to charge an interest fee on long-term funds borrowed from the bank. (This is in addition to the capital charge paid the government.) Previously, money obtained for long-term capital purchases was treated as a free commodity and allocated from the government budget. In the same way, the introduction of rent under the new system stimulates economy in the use of land.

NEW POWERS FOR MANAGERS

The introduction of these more rational tools has been accompanied by an increase in the powers delegated to the enterprise manager. Although some enterprises have more prerogatives than others, the trend is to allow the enterprise manager to determine such questions as the salaries of individual workers, the size and makeup of his work force, the nature of his output and, within limits, even the prices of his products. In the same manner, up to 20 per cent of total national investment is to be determined by the plant manager at the factory. Before reform all investment was determined centrally by state planning officials.

Similarly, there has been an increase in the wholesale trade of the means of production between factories without the interference of central authorities. Previously, almost everything was allocated centrally according to specified plans. Now factories are being

allowed and even encouraged to purchase many of their needs on the spot without previous authorization.

It is true that for many plant managers some of these prerogatives have not been fully realized due to continued interference from the ministries and other supervisory organizations. Moreover, it may also be true, as some critics have charged, that such radical (or reactionary!) concepts as capital charges, interest and rent have little impact because prices generally are meaningless since they do not reflect true costs or demand. Still, it is important to remember that the foundation has been laid. After all, the top floor on a building can not be built in the first week of construction.

As most observers have noted, the key to the success of the reform is prices. If they accurately reflect economic costs and scarcities, then the enterprise manager will choose the most economical or rational combination of raw materials and will produce those goods which satisfy the most people as he seeks to maximize his sales revenues, profits and rate of return. If prices are improperly set, then there will be an irrational use of raw materials, production distortions and possibly monopoly profits. Based on the price reforms of July, 1967, and plans for future price adjustments, it is reassuring to see that the Russians seem to recognize most of these hazards and are moving slowly to implement them. There is more they could do toward acknowledging the concept of marginal productivity, but the first steps have been taken.²

As of September, 1968, there seems to be no immediate reason why the invasion of Czechoslovakia should necessitate a retreat from economic reform in the U.S.S.R. In the first place, the reforms at one time proposed and partially implemented in Czechoslovakia were considerably more radical in their tone and implications than those the Russians have been talking about for themselves. The Czechs were thinking about such "revolutionary" ideas as private enterprise in the service industries, complete decentralization in the operation of state-owned enterprises and convertible exchange rates for their

² *Economicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 28, June, 1968, p. 11.

currency. If carried to their ultimate conclusion, the Soviet reforms could possibly lead to similar proposals, but for the present the Russians in charge have nothing so radical in mind. Thus there is no reason to expect a retrenchment in the course of the Soviet economic reforms. Indeed it appears that almost all Soviet enterprises will be operating under the new setup by the beginning of 1969, just as originally scheduled.

It is all but impossible to establish the precise causal relationship, but the Soviet economy evidenced an upturn in economic growth in the year 1966. This coincided with the conversion of the first 43 firms to the new economic reforms. By the end of the year, there were close to 700 enterprises operating on the new system. Undoubtedly some of the impetus for the improved growth rate was also due to the organizational and policy changes instituted by Chairman Alexei Kosygin and Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev after what they called Nikita Khrushchev's "harebrained" ideas. Thus they curbed some of Khrushchev's more exuberant programs and instituted a more orderly approach in several economic sectors such as agriculture. In any case, the early years of the reform also marked an improvement in economic growth which in turn created the proper atmosphere for further reforms.

The spurt in economic growth made it possible to devote more of the country's resources to consumption. By 1968, conditions had improved so much that the consumer goods sector of the economy was targeted to grow faster than the capital goods sector. This is the first time this has happened since the start of the five-year plans in the late 1920's. This slow but continuing improvement in the living conditions of Soviet citizens has generated its own interesting and contradictory effects.

In recent years, the living conditions of the average Soviet citizen, especially the urban

resident, has improved markedly. After the poor harvests of 1963 and 1965, there was a temporary deterioration in the quantity and quality of food, but otherwise the trend has been one of significant progress. The first need has been housing and the Russian government has finally responded. After Josef Stalin died, the government finally began to acknowledge the problem and started a giant program of construction. In 1967, the Russians opened 2,315,000 new apartments compared with fewer than 1,500,000 built in the United States during the same year.³ Of course Americans build more private houses than the Russians do. Moreover, the Russian apartments leave much to be desired, including, on occasion, hot and cold running water. Consequently, Karandash, one of Russia's most popular circus clowns, has a skit in which he enters the ring carrying a toilet, a sink, a few cabinets and various door knobs and window frames. When asked why he is carrying that strange assortment of equipment, he replies that he has just moved into a new apartment building.

While an astonishingly large number of Russians live in substandard housing, (that is, three or more people in one room with a kitchen and toilet shared with two or three other families) the housing program has inspired hope that even these families will soon be able to move to their own private apartments.

Similarly, there has been a rapid surge in the sale of appliances and other household items. In 1967, Russian consumers bought over 4 million television sets, 2,416,000 refrigerators and 3,881,000 washing machines. Again, many of these items were of substandard quality and not nearly so automatic or sophisticated as similar American or European counterparts, but these are respectable production figures, even of poor quality merchandise. After all, as recently as 1960, sales of such goods in the U.S.S.R. were about one-quarter of present levels. Thus in 1960 the Russians offered for sale only a million and a half television sets, 518,000 refrigerators and 957,000 washing machines.⁴ The figures are not so spectacular when it comes to prod-

³ Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Strana Sovetov za 50 Let*. Moscow, Statistika, 1967, p. 246; and Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *SSSR v Tsifrakh v 1967*. Godu. Moscow, Statistika, 1968, p. 136.

⁴ *SSSR v Tsifrakh v 1967*. Godu. p. 146.

ucts like clothing and food, but even these products have become much more abundant and quality has improved.

NEW PROBLEMS

As satisfying as this growth has been, it sometimes has created as many problems as it has solved. Economists and sociologists long ago discovered that the acquisition of one item usually stimulates demands for others. Just when he thinks he has satisfied his immediate demands, the purchaser finds that he suddenly needs some other item which "complements" the use of the first item he purchased. At the same time, other consumers find their appetites whetted by the "demonstration effect" of those who have already purchased the item. The result is that even though consumers are much better off in material terms, they often feel unsatisfied because they have developed new demands in the meantime. Now they sense how much more there is for them to possess.

The discontent accompanying and stemming from an increase in goods and services is easily illustrated. In their effort to improve living conditions, the Russians are making a valiant effort to increase the range of services such as laundries available to the housewife. Undoubtedly this is a marked improvement over former conditions when all laundry had to be washed at home or in the nearby stream. But because the personnel in the laundry tends to be surly and inefficient, the opportunities for frustration and discontent often appear to be as great as before. Sometimes, we are more content in ignorance than in knowledge. This may have been the secret of the Iron Curtain.

Despite the fact that conditions have improved for the average Russian household, it is still frustrating for a Russian to look outside his country at the progress made elsewhere. It is hard for him to understand how it is that the Japanese economy, for example, has been growing at a rate that is sometimes twice as fast as that attained by the Russian

economy.⁵ Similarly most of the countries of Western Europe, except perhaps the United Kingdom, now have growth rates that match or sometimes exceed those of the Soviet Union. It is not only that the Russian growth rates are no longer unique, but that the amounts used for consumption and enjoyment in this lifetime outside the U.S.S.R. seem to be—and are—so much higher. The Russian government diverts large sums to capital investment and military undertakings. Thus, despite the improvements in the living conditions of the average Russian consumer, the living conditions of the average Japanese and Italian consumer (not to mention the German consumer) have been improving even faster. The Russians are especially perplexed by the flood of Japanese tourists that has started to inundate the U.S.S.R. within the last two or three years. Since travel requires money, the Russians are unable to understand how these once poor people have become so rich so suddenly.

No one argues that a faster improvement in the standard of living will solve all of Russia's problems. As we have seen, it could cause other problems. Nonetheless, some authorities are coming to realize that failure to provide improvements may in itself hamper economic growth. Whether it be because of heavy taxes, low wages, high prices or lack of high quality merchandise in the stores, work incentives will be adversely affected if the worker feels there is no sense in working because there is nothing for him to buy with his take-home pay. If the employee is overworked, or overtired, his productivity is likely to fall. This has been a serious problem for the Russian housewife. Most women in the U.S.S.R. have full-time jobs in addition to their roles as housewives. Fortunately, since their apartments are small, there is less need to spend much time keeping their living quarters clean. But the Soviet housewife is much less fortunate in other respects. The shopping process is unbelievably cumbersome and frustrating. Since the state owns all the stores, it has reduced distribution costs by holding down the number of stores it has built. The fewer stores there are, the lower

⁵ Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Performance: 1966-67* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 12.

the construction costs and the lower the wages. As might be expected, the problems have been solved by queuing. The effect is that the state holds its distribution costs down but only at the expense of placing the burden on the consumer, who must inevitably stand in line and waste her time. From the state's point of view, this should be a way to save money. If the consumer were not standing in line, presumably she would not spend the extra time working in a government enterprise anyway. Moreover, since private work is generally prohibited, she is not sacrificing extra income.

THE HOUSEWIFE'S PROBLEMS

Recently some Russian economists have been arguing that this is fallacious reasoning and that the lack of stores and poor services in the existing stores does adversely affect the country's economic production after all. If the housewife has to stand in innumerable queues for everything she wants to buy (less than seven per cent of all food stores in the Soviet Union are run on a self-service basis⁶), the result is that she is tired when she returns home. If, in addition to running a household and doing the shopping, she must also hold a full-time post, she is going to give something less than everything she has to the job. Inevitably her productivity and workmanship will leave a good deal to be desired. Obviously, there are many additional factors which explain the poor quality of production in the U.S.S.R., but clearly this is an important one. Women make up over half the labor force, and even constitute about 30 per cent of the construction force. Many of the painters and even carpenters are women. Given their triple roles in life (painters, shoppers and housewives) it is easy to understand their lack of enthusiasm for their craft. As anyone who has watched their work can testify, they are unbelievably sloppy and they seem to take no care in their performance. Inevitably the workmanship is very shabby and the productivity is low.

One reason for the economic reform in the

U.S.S.R. is the need to alleviate some of these shortcomings and satisfy some of the pressures for better consumption. To the extent that the reform succeeds in resolving some of these difficulties through economic means, there may be no need for additional political reforms. At the same time, what happens if the economic reforms do not succeed in resolving existing problems? An even more intriguing question is whether or not there is a danger that any meaningful reform will set off its own set of reverberations that may in time lead to exactly the tendencies that so frightened the Russians when they observed them in Czechoslovakia.

While almost all the Russian economic reforms can be shown to be justified as necessary steps for improving the effectiveness of production and the morale of the Soviet citizen, they may also generate a whole new set of economic, political and sociological complications. We know that often those who are best off in terms of economic privilege are among the most unhappy because they see how much more there is that they could have. In contrast, ignorance is stultifying. Only after the black man's economic position in the United States began to improve did his demands for better treatment mount to the present volume.

In the same way, increased rationality in one sphere of life tends to provoke demands for similar rationality in other spheres. Thus a more rational procedure for the allocation of resources is likely to lead to a reappraisal and review of past allocation procedures. There may well be demands to know why "obviously" uneconomic decisions were made and resources wasted. Since political considerations have played an important role in such decisions as the preference for dams and

(Continued on page 304)

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⁶ *Sovetskaia Torgovlia*, March, 1968, p. 3.

This article compares the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet and United States scientific development, probing the reasons for their differing rates of progress.

Recent Developments in Soviet Science and Technology

BY RICHARD ROCKINGHAM GILL
Radio Free Europe

Communist society can be built only on the summits of science and engineering.—V. I. Lenin.

FORTY-FIVE YEARS after Lenin pronounced this slogan, Soviet science is still climbing towards these twin peaks, and has already conquered many of the foothills and some of the high ground on the final approach.

The cost of the Soviet scientific effort is already huge for a country with only about half of the United States gross national product. The cost of the Soviet effort is now rising at about 10 per cent per year, i.e., a little faster than the growth rate for industry. Year after year, Soviet science is getting a larger share of the national cake, and the process will continue at least until 1970.

The U.S.S.R. has a longer series of statistics on scientific expenditure and personnel than any other country, and the Soviet figures illustrate the speed of the scientific explosion. If we take the official figures first, at two-year intervals during the past decade, the expenditure growth has been almost four-fold (see Table I).

Certainly the United States spends about three times as much in absolute figures (\$24 billion in 1967, of which \$15 billion was for government research and development),¹ but because of the great difference in scientific costs in the two countries, it is thought possible that the Kremlin gets about three times as much research per ruble as does the United States.² If this calculation is approximately correct, then the U.S.S.R. is now spending almost as much in real terms as the United States, although Moscow's effort is mounted from a much smaller economic base.

The Soviet use of scientific manpower also seems to be more lavish. From 1950 to 1962, the growth rate for Soviet research manpower was almost 13 per cent per year, at a time when the comparable United States figure (for 1954–1962) was about 9 per cent per year. Since then the growth rates in both countries have tended to slow down slightly, but the margin in favor of the U.S.S.R. has remained (see Table II).

There is abundant evidence from Soviet sources that a recent decline of productivity has taken place, and is causing serious concern to the nation's more critical scientific minds. Thus *Izvestia*³ has complained that progress is often delayed due to the shortage of technicians able to do routine work for the large numbers of scientists and engineers now available; it stated bluntly that the large

¹ *The New York Times*, January 14, 1968.

² C. Freeman and A. Young, *The Research and Development Effort* (Paris: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 1965), p. 33.

³ The official government newspaper.

Table I: Soviet Official Expenditure on Science

(in billions of new rubles)

1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968 (plan)
2.4	3.3	4.3	5.4	6.8	7.9

Table II: Number of Soviet Scientific Workers

(official—in thousands)

	1950	1960	1965	1967
Total (all scientific workers)	162	354	712	770
Doctors of Science	8.3	10.9	14.8	18.3
Bachelors of Science	45	98	134	169

expansion in the numbers of scientists and designers "has not been accompanied by a significant increase in the effects of their labor."

In Leningrad, which is the U.S.S.R.'s second largest scientific center, there was as recently as 1965 only one technician for every two engineers, whereas the ratio should be the reverse. This bottleneck would seem to be relatively easy to eliminate, but a more basic difficulty lies in the misdirection of Soviet funds. Only last year Academician Vadim Trapeznikov noted that more than 50 per cent of Soviet research projects took so long to go into production that they were already out of date when introduced.⁴ He explained this by saying that the U.S.S.R. spends less on applying the results of research than on research itself, whereas in the United States the expenditure on application is about three times as great as the outlays for research. Trapeznikov also rapped Soviet industry over the knuckles, pointing out that United States companies spend 30-40 per cent of their funds on research and development; whereas in the United States 60 per cent of scientists work in industry, in the U.S.S.R. 98 per cent of them are in institutes distinct from industry.

Despite these basic criticisms, Trapeznikov also produced an impressive case for greater scientific investment, when he argued that in the 1966-1970 plan period every ruble invested in expanding industrial capacity would increase the national income by about 39

kopecks, but every ruble invested in science would produce a 150-kopeck growth of national income.

Any such calculation must inevitably be extremely tenuous, but figures of this kind do help to explain the Kremlin's apparent willingness to let scientific outlays grow much faster than the national product. One of the Soviet difficulties in expanding the quality and productivity of its science effort is caused by the fact that there is, understandably, no "brain drain" to the U.S.S.R. For a "brain drain" to begin would require not only a much higher standard of living than the Soviet Union can now offer, but also that "atmosphere of free discussion, polemics and airing of ideas, even if some of them are radically wrong," for which Professor Pyotr L. Kapitsa, the Soviet nuclear physicist, pleaded in vain last year.⁵

AN INTERNAL BRAIN DRAIN

But within the U.S.S.R. there is an internal "brain drain" of a kind familiar to students of the politics of science in the United States. Because of centralized political control, there is a systematic inclination to concentrate research in those institutes which are attached to central ministries. Then, as Professor Lisichkin has noted,⁶ the research institutes become classified in a hierarchical pattern, with salaries proportional to the prestige enjoyed by the institute concerned. The result is a "brain drain" upwards to the prestige research bodies, leaving the lower-grade agencies bereft of qualified staff.

⁴ *Pravda*, January 19, 1967.

⁵ *Yunost*, No. 1, 1967.

⁶ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, January 19, 1967.

. Even as recently as 1967, the heads of Soviet institutes did not have the right to plan their own staff requirements, with the result that frequently senior research scientists had to type their own reports because of the dearth of secretaries, or waste half their days building low-grade apparatus because of the lack of technicians.⁷

REASONS FOR RAPID PROGRESS

The immense progress made by the U.S.S.R. in selected scientific areas (rocketing, space, air transport, nuclear physics and so forth) since the war is by now well known to every Western newspaper reader. What is perhaps not so widely understood is the organizational structure which has made such rapid advances possible. At the center there is the State Committee for Science and Technology, which is headed by V. A. Kirillin, a deputy minister of the U.S.S.R.

Kirillin is also a vice president of the extremely powerful Academy of Sciences U.S.S.R. and a candidate member of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U. (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). Because of his triple functions in the party, the government and the academy, it seems likely that he has great influence in science policy decisions.⁸

In the government, the State Committee headed by Kirillin bears the responsibility for formulating the main lines of science policy, which are then worked out in more detail at a lower level by the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences and the other ministries and state committees. For economic questions in which scientists are involved, the State Planning Agency (Gosplan) participates in the detailed formulation.

The program elaborated in this way is then carried out by the institutes of the Academy of Sciences and by the university and ministerial research bodies.

Scientific councils have also been established, because by the end of the 1950's it

was realized that it was impossible to plan all research work from Moscow. A typical scientific council includes the most prominent research specialists in its field, designers from the large engineering plants producing that type of product, and members of Gosplan's related commissions and of the state's other economic agencies. It coordinates the research done in several dozen different establishments throughout the U.S.S.R., acts as an information exchange center, makes the appropriate recommendations for the initiation, expansion or closing-down of certain projects at individual institutes. In all there are about 100 of these scientific councils, each operating in a defined area such as welding, plastics or atomic energy.

The Communist party's major criticism of Soviet science for many years past has been that too much pure scientific effort is accompanied by too little application of the results. In an effort to close this gap at least partially, inter-branch institutes have been organized to tackle research problems which go beyond the bounds of any one branch of science alone.

As in the West, Soviet science is seriously hampered by the problems of duplication, wasted effort and overlapping, the detection of which is seriously inhibited by the country's excessive concern with its security worries. But Soviet officials tend to argue that duplication is not always undesirable. Academician B. E. Paton once pointed out that "there are always several solutions to the same problem, and it is difficult to determine at once which of them will prove to be more effective."⁹

TRANSFERRED RESPONSIBILITIES

Until 1961, the Academy of Sciences U.S.S.R. was responsible for the branch research institutes, but in that year the task of controlling them was transferred to the respective ministries in order to free the Academy for the key scientific research problems. At the same time the Academy's numerous branches in the Union Republics were told that in future their main duty would be to assist the local councils of ministers in the economic development of their Republics.

⁷ *Literary Gazette*, Moscow, March 8, 1967.

⁸ See letter by Professor J. Turkevich, *Minerva* (London), vol. V, No. 3, Spring, 1967, pp. 430-434.

⁹ *Impact of Science on Society*, XV, No. 2, (1965), p. 79.

THE RISE OF THE SELF-FINANCING SYSTEM

In 1961, the Council of Ministers U.S.S.R. published a momentous decision which instructed research and development institutes in industry, transport, communications and so on to transfer to a self-financing system whereby 5 per cent of their annual budget estimates were to be covered by the receipts from direct contracts made with enterprises in their respective fields.¹⁰ This order, which released the state budget from a small part of its scientific burden, was enthusiastically enforced by the Kremlin, where those studying the "science of science" soon decided that the proportion of research costs covered by direct contracts should now be raised to 14.5 per cent.¹¹ This figure was fixed by the Ministry of Finance and the State Committee for Science and Technology, and understandably it was immediately attacked at the working level.

Planning for such an "unjustifiably" high income would lead to far too great a stress on profitable contracts, it was said, and therefore to a neglect of fundamental research. Consequently only the research institutes themselves should determine their annual plans, leaving them to decide on the level of their supplementary (i.e., direct contract) income.

In the past the Ministry of Finance has foreclosed all the contractual asset balances of institutes on December 30 each year, leaving much work to be carried out for which no funds were available. It is therefore proposed that future incomes should be credited inalienably to each institute as earned, and that overfulfillment of a contract should result in the additional assets being ploughed back into research for extra equipment, staff, travel or facilities. Thus the material incentives which are now so widely discussed in Soviet industry would also be given a much freer rein in science.

In biology and geology, in particular, the problem of contract income is aggravated by

the fact that neither the Ministry of Agriculture nor the Ministry of Geology pay for the major financial benefits derived from the biological and geological divisions of the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences.

Consequently, the scientists concerned are now demanding that the transfer of research results into production without payment should cease, and that in the future results of research should be sold on a commercial basis. In this they will probably have the support of the State Committee for Science and Technology which since 1966 has been putting into practice the hint dropped by the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Alexei Kosygin, at the 23d Congress of the C.P.S.U.: "Until recently we tended to underestimate the importance of the trade in patents and licenses."

At the time, Kosygin was speaking in the international context, but his words clearly make sense within the U.S.S.R. as well, and the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences is now stressing the fact.

THE "SCIENCE CITIES"

One of the potentially most far-reaching reforms in Soviet science led to the recent establishment of a new town, Akademgorodok, near Novosibirsk, in Siberia. In conception, it is somewhat similar to United States Vice President Hubert Humphrey's idea for a "pilot city for a new America," but instead of solving urban problems, Akademgorodok is designed to deal with those of research and development. The planning began about 11 years ago, to establish a "center of excellence" based on a scientific institute with at least 60 per cent of the staff to be young. As far as possible the new town was to be economically justifiable, to train scientists both for its own expansion and for the incorporation of its research in industry, and to include a small university of only 3,000-4,000 students of an exceptionally gifted, elite nature. By now the university is taking only one applicant in six, and there are already 1,000 bachelors of science in the town's population of only 40,000 people.

¹⁰ Decision of U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, April 1, 1961. See *Economic Gazette*, No. 24, 1968, p. 13.

¹¹ *Economic Gazette*, No. 24, 1968.

Both basic and applied research are pursued there, and to ensure that the end product is really useful to industry the town has two pilot plants which carry out final production experiments and train the necessary installation and maintenance personnel. The aim is to eliminate the three stages of the traditional "conveyor belt" system (research institute—design office—factory) by merging stage two into stage one. This is said to have produced some important successes, such as high-powered presses with an impact force of 1,550,000 foot-pounds, based on the theory of hydraulic pulse jets.¹²

The "science city" experiment has been successful enough for planning to be under way at present for the establishment of more such centers, possibly near Krasnoyarsk and near Irkutsk.

Probably because of the ample funds provided for its partly military applications, Soviet space research seems to have produced an outstanding list of successes. The first satellite, the first space flight by an animal, the first moon satellite, the first space rocket, the first hard landings on the moon and on Venus, the first automatic unmanned space docking, the first soft landing on Venus—all these achievements show the high quality of Soviet science at its best. Incidentally, they also seem to be making the world a safer place to live in. The constant surveillance satellites of the Cosmos series provide regular and firm evidence to the Kremlin that neither the United States nor West Germany is about to attack the U.S.S.R. (whatever Soviet propagandists may find it convenient to say), and the Soviet scientists' firm conviction that no likely antiballistic missile system (ABM) could secure the cities of the U.S.S.R. against American attack must have been a major factor in Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's statement that the Kremlin is prepared to discuss both the ABM and ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile system) complexes with Washington.

In atomic power, although the U.S.S.R.

seems to lag behind both the United States and Great Britain in reducing its costs to a competitive level, the Soviet industry has now emerged as a serious challenger on the international market, as the recent inaction by Finland shows. Although as yet the only Soviet-designed nuclear power stations abroad are being built in the Communist countries, the Soviet offer to Finland was good enough to prevent a Western competitor from capturing that market, although not good enough to seize it for the U.S.S.R.

CYBERNETICS LAG

Cybernetics, for all the impressive achievement in the space and military fields, seems to be one area in which the U.S.S.R. is seriously behind the United States in civilian applications. The United States has more numerous, more reliable, more economic, more compact computers, and a much higher rate of production. The U.S.S.R.'s lag has been variously estimated by the experts, but almost all seem to agree that it represents at least three years' work and possibly five before the Soviet industry can expect to attain even the present United States standard. Much of this backwardness is due to the negative Stalinist ideological attitude towards cybernetics, which slowed the industry in its early years.

Chemistry is another of the U.S.S.R.'s weaker branches. Industrial chemistry is evidently years behind the West in such products as synthetic fibers, plastics and so forth, but in electrochemistry the U.S.S.R. is believed to be in the front rank.

In physics, there is no doubt that the Soviet position is a strong one. Indeed a major United States physicist, Dr. Marvin L. Goldberger of Princeton University, said in April, 1968, that it was "very likely" that the United States leadership in high-energy physics would soon pass to the Soviet Union or to West Europe.¹³ This gloomy prediction was partly caused by the United States failure so far to provide the apparatus for producing the colliding beams of high-energy particles on a scale as large as the U.S.S.R. already possesses in the facilities at Novosibirsk.

Geology is a highly developed science in the

¹² *Impact of Science on Society*, vol XVI, No. 4, (1967), article by M. Lavrentiev.

¹³ *The New York Times*, April 25, 1968.

U.S.S.R., with prospecting for oil and gas accounting for more than 50 per cent of the geological effort. Some 8,000 explorations are begun each year, and it is now claimed that Soviet known reserves of coal, manganese, iron, lead, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, molybdenum and diamonds are the largest in the world.¹⁴ The Soviet geologists have a fair-sized air force at their disposal with more than 1,000 aircraft and helicopters in operation.¹⁵

Biology, on the other hand, has suffered like cybernetics at the hands of Stalinist and neo-Stalinist ideologists, and it was not until 1965 that M. V. Keldysh, the President of the Academy of Sciences U.S.S.R. finally exposed the Lysenkoites for their part in 18 years of near stagnation.

In aviation, the Soviet scientists and engineers now stand a reasonable chance of seeing their first supersonic transport fly before the French-British *Concorde* takes to the air. When the Soviet Tu-104 beat the Boeing 707 into service, the West could explain that, after all, it was an adapted version of a bomber. One waits with some anxiety for our rationalization of the Soviet supersonic Tu-144's lead, hoping that perhaps Toulouse will yet put Tupolev in second place. But whichever plane flies first, the Tu-144 still appears to be a major scientific achievement.

THE PROBLEM OF SCIENTIFIC EDUCATION

The Soviet problem in the training of scientists is no longer one of quantity but of quality. In 1967, there were 18,000 doctors of science, 169,000 bachelors, 14,700 academicians, associate members and professors, and 57,000 lecturers in the total of 770,000 scientific workers. Two years earlier, the United States had had 503,600 scientists and engineers.¹⁶

The university degree courses (now five years) appear to some senior Soviet critics to be too long, and could be cut with advantage to four years. The money saved could then

be allocated to post-graduate courses lasting two years for the best of the students, who would thereby qualify to enter a research institute on completion of their six-year course.¹⁷

At the secondary school level, the most gifted children may be selected for entry into one of the special boarding schools which have been established primarily to teach physics or mathematics. If it is true that the end product of such a school may be too narrow a specialist, it also seems likely that in many cases he or she will be remarkably well versed in the chosen field.

One of the serious difficulties in scientific education is the shortage of good experimental equipment, because the precision instruments industry was neglected for many years. Since full transistorization only began in the U.S.S.R. in about 1964, much of the equipment (including computers for training purposes) is unnecessarily bulky, thereby aggravating the chronic shortage of space in so many of the universities and technical colleges.

To the Western mind, and to that of such a brilliant Western-trained scientist as Pyotr Kapitsa, undoubtedly the biggest single stumbling-block in the scientific educational process is the timidity left behind by the years of Stalinism. Many Soviet science students and even more of their teachers have not yet learned to argue, to exchange opinions frankly, and to express conflicting views. As Kapitsa put it in the columns of the youth magazine:

One cannot know the truth in advance; one can only reach it and test it as a result of the struggle of opposites. . . . As you grow old, it is only the young, only your pupils who can save you from premature mental stagnation. . . . It is not enough to say of the young that they are our future. They are also our present.¹⁸

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¹⁴ *Moscow Radio*, April 7, 1968.

¹⁵ *Trud*, April 2, 1967.

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, January 14, 1968.

¹⁷ *Vestnik Vysshei Shkoly*, No. 11, 1967, pp. 49-50.

¹⁸ *Yunost*, No. 1, 1968.

BOOK REVIEWS

On the U.S.S.R.

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

SOVIET LEADERS. EDITED BY GEORGE W. SIMMONDS. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967. 405 pages, glossary and index. \$10.00.)

Biographical information on Soviet leaders is not readily available. This reference offers 42 in-depth profiles of key Soviet figures. The careers and achievements of prominent Soviet politicians, scientists, artists and military men are developed in informative and interesting fashion.

THE PERMANENT CRISIS. BY KURT LONDON. (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1968. 246 pages, bibliography and index, \$2.95.)

This book, which is a thorough revision of a work published in 1962, focuses attention "on the far-reaching changes in the character and substance of world politics" and suggests the main reasons for these changes. Professor London is the Director of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at the George Washington University. His thesis may be stated briefly: that Marxism-Leninism remains a key determinant of the international political behavior of Communist states, notwithstanding the divisions that have emerged within the bloc or the manifestations there of limited nationalist initiatives.

In crisp and lucid chapters, he touches on the factors of power, the forces making for change in a changing world, and the background of the United States confrontation with the Communist world. He deals with such key questions as decision-making,

intelligence-gathering and evaluation, and the evolution of political doctrine against the background of the major developments of the past decade, e.g., the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Cuban missile crisis, and disarmament. This is a stimulating book.

ISLAM IN THE SOVIET UNION. BY ALEXANDRE BENNIGSEN AND CHANTAL LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 272 pages, select bibliography and index. \$7.00.)

There are about 25 million Muslims living in the Soviet Union. In general, little is known of the degree to which they have become assimilated into Soviet society or of the persistence of nationality and religious sentiment in the Central Asian areas of the U.S.S.R.

Two distinguished French social scientists examine the lot of the Muslims in the Soviet Union, tracing the development of this question over the past few centuries. They discuss the situation before 1917, the impact of the Bolshevik triumph on the Muslim areas, the evolution of Soviet nationality policy, and the recent attempts made by the Soviet leadership to ensure the loyalty of Muslim groups while intensifying the drive to "modernize" and "Russify" the Muslim elites. The preservation by the Muslims of their religious and ethnic distinctiveness is apt to be reinforced as a consequence of two developments in the field of foreign policy: Moscow's courtship of the Arab and Muslim world; and the Sino-Soviet rift.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Communiqué on Talks Between Soviet and Czechoslovak Leaders

On August 27, 1968, Tass, the Soviet news agency, released an official report of Moscow talks between Soviet officials and the Czechoslovak leaders who were forceably brought to the conference following the invasion of their country by Warsaw Pact forces. The talks began on August 23, 1968, and were intended to last one day. Instead the conference did not end until August 26. At the conclusion of the talks, the Czechoslovak leaders returned to Prague to explain the forced concessions to their countrymen. Excerpts from the Soviet text follow:

During the talks in a free comradely discussion the two sides considered questions relating to the present development of the international situation, the activization of imperialism's machinations against the socialist countries, the situation in Czechoslovakia in the recent period and the temporary entry of troops of the five socialist countries into Czechoslovak territory.

The sides expressed their mutual firm belief that the main thing in the present situation is to carry out the mutual decisions adopted in Cierna and Tisou and the provisions and principles formulated by the Bratislava conference, as well as to implement consistently the practical steps following from the agreement reached during the talks.

The Soviet side stated its understanding of and support for the position of the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist party and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which intends to proceed from the decisions passed by the January and May plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist party with a view to improving the methods of guiding society, developing socialist democracy and strengthening the socialist system on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

Agreement was reached on measures aimed at the speediest normalization of the situation in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Czechoslovak leaders informed the Soviet side on the planned immediate measures they are carrying out with these aims in view.

It was stated by the Czechoslovak side that all the work of party and state bodies through all media would be directed at insuring effective measures serving the socialist power, the guiding role

of the working class and the Communist party, the interests of developing and strengthening friendly relations with the peoples of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community.

Expressing the unanimous striving of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. for friendship and brotherhood with the peoples of socialist Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leaders confirmed their readiness for the broadest sincere cooperation on the basis of mutual respect, equality, territorial integrity, independence and socialist solidarity.

The troops of the allied countries, that entered temporarily the territory of Czechoslovakia, will not interfere in the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Agreement was reached on the terms of the withdrawal of these troops from its territory as the situation in Czechoslovakia normalizes.

The Czechoslovak side informed the Soviet side that the supreme commander in chief of the Czechoslovak armed forces had given the latter appropriate orders with the aim of preventing incidents and conflicts capable of violating the peace and public order. He also instructed the military command of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to be in contact with the command of the allied troops.

In connection with the discussion in the United Nations Security Council of the so-called question on the situation in Czechoslovakia, the representatives of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic stated that the Czechoslovak side had not requested the submission of this question for consideration by the Security Council and demanded its removal from the agenda.

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POLITICS IN SOVIET RUSSIA

(Continued from page 262)

teachers to present more stimulating and vital material in their courses in Marx-Leninism and in general social sciences. The Central Committee passed a resolution on improving the social sciences in August, 1967, and a conference of social science teachers was held in June, 1968, and given extensive publicity. However, given the low quality of the social sciences and its personnel and the failure of the party leadership to modernize the ideology for the current scene, the possibility of fulfilling this task is doubtful.

The dismissal of S. P. Pavlov as leader of the *Komsomols* may be one more attempt to shake up the youth movement for its failure to indoctrinate and attract youth except under coercion. The appointment of a relatively obscure 40-year-old provincial party secretary, Ye. M. Tyazhelnikov, as *Komsomol* leader would seem to indicate that the party itself will assume greater control.

The problem of nationalism among the numerous minorities is potentially as dangerous to the system as any anti-Communist movement and is a constant concern of the regime. The main stress of the Soviet nationality policy continues to be equalizing living standards and opportunities throughout Russia to win over the various peoples.⁸ At the same time, some of the more advanced nationalities as in the Baltic states have been allowed to experiment in education, housing and industrial organization forms on their own. In the last year there has also been an increase in the number of articles condemning bourgeois nationalism and extolling the glories of the multi-national Russian state.

For all the effort and intensity of the campaign against radical change, beyond improved living standards and some organizational changes, nothing new has emerged to

capture the enthusiasm of the masses, particularly the youth and intellectuals and, as Western experience shows, there is no guarantee that increased affluence, patriotic indoctrination or even coercion can keep the younger generation in line—in fact, these policies may encourage rebellion. It is doubtful whether the Soviet Union can isolate itself from the social currents prevalent throughout the world, particularly when the conditions (congested cities, alienation, advanced education, affluence, parental indulgence, large minorities) which give rise to these forces are very much present in the Soviet Union.

OPPOSITION OF INTELLECTUALS

There is also growing evidence that more and more Soviet intellectuals are thinking along lines different from the regime. In opposition to renewing Soviet isolation, Andrei D. Sakharov, a physicist and a member of the highly respected Academy of Sciences, has circulated an essay stressing that the Soviet Union and the United States—the two superpowers—must come closer together and work together if widespread destruction in the world is to be avoided.⁹ The Czech crisis is likely to be even more divisive. Many Soviet intellectuals were shocked and ashamed of Soviet intervention in Hungary and certainly are even more upset because of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, which has been condemned even by major Communist parties.

Thus the picture of the Soviet Union today is that of an aged conservative regime which, after several power struggles, seems to be learning to balance and moderate the various interests within its leadership circles. Longer than any other major country, it has managed to avoid the forces of social change which have been sweeping the world since World War II. There is evidence, however, of a growing cleavage in Soviet society which may force change. The Soviet leaders have the advantage of recognizing the danger and of being willing to use force, perhaps even wide-scale terror, to stop it. But whether force and terror will be enough to preserve Communist autocracy one can only guess.

⁸ In September, 1967, Moscow finally rehabilitated and exonerated the Crimea Tartars after 23 years.

⁹ For a full text of the essay by A. D. Sakharov see *The New York Times*, July 22, 1968, pp. 14–16.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Continued from page 280)

To date, although the Soviets have been giving aid to North Vietnam, they have retained even more options than the Chinese for disengaging from Vietnam. Specifically, the Soviets have kept open their diplomatic channels with the United States. And, on occasions prior to the opening of the United States-North Vietnamese talks in Paris in May of this year, the Soviets attempted to persuade North Vietnam to negotiate with the United States and thus to transform the military conflict into a political-diplomatic struggle. Finally, they have not made an open and unambiguous military commitment. Indeed, their closest approach to a military commitment has been a carefully worded reference to "volunteers."

The foregoing discussion suggests how the Soviets have sought to exploit the Vietnamese conflict—while minimizing its dangers—in order ultimately to expel the United States from and to thwart Red Chinese ambitions in Southeast Asia. These imperatives also apply to Soviet policy elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Thus, the Soviets oppose the United States encouragement of the formation of regional organizations such as the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Soviets view this as a United States effort, based on Indonesian power, to maintain its presence in the area under a politically acceptable cover. They charge the Indonesian military with collaborating with the United States to promote and advance this scheme.

In opposing the regional cooperation inherent in such an organization, the Soviets imply a preference for facing divided Southeast Asia countries and dealing with them individually, presumably because this would expose them to greater Soviet influence or pressure. (Indeed, the Soviets have exhibited sensitivity in the past to any regional arrangement they could not control.)

While opposing any regional grouping of Southeast Asian nations under United States

aegis, the Soviets at the same time are seeking to win these nations over to containing what the Soviets describe as Red China's great power ambitions and her objective of restoring the Imperial China of several centuries ago. In this effort, the Soviet Union has been prepared to deal on a non-ideological basis—and has actually done so—with the very same nations it has attacked for serving as "instruments of United States imperialism."

The most recent manifestation of changing Soviet policy in Asia in general was the Soviet offer of arms shipments to Pakistan in an effort to wean her away from Red China. This action is a sequel to the earlier Soviet role as mediator between India and Pakistan in the 1965 conflict; this was in the context of Soviet support for non-Communist regimes in both countries against Red China—a nation with whom the Soviets would be allied if "proletarian internationalism and solidarity" had any current application. In fact, in pursuing a great power policy, the Soviets are paying minimal attention to indigenous Communist parties in India, Pakistan and elsewhere in Asia. Indeed, these parties have been subordinated to the Soviet policy of dealing with and influencing non-Communist regimes, even to the detriment of the local parties. (This is best demonstrated by continuing Soviet relations with the military regime of Indonesia which decimated the Indonesian Communist party several years ago, and used Soviet arms in the bargain.) In a similar vein, the Soviets have sought to improve diplomatic and trade relations with Malaysia, Singapore and even Thailand, despite the fact that all have been accused at one time or another of being the tools either of United States or British imperialism.

These current examples of a non-ideological Soviet approach to Southeast Asia demonstrate most vividly that ideological imperatives are receding and that great power considerations now dominate Soviet policy in Southeast Asia. The benefits the Soviets have gained from a pragmatic, non-ideological approach in that region may assuage their disappointment in losing their standing as an

untarnished revolutionary force riding the wave of history.

Indeed, in his heyday, Khrushchev expressed the Soviet Union's pride in being a great power (*velikoderzhava*) which had interests everywhere and without which no international problem could be solved. While Khrushchev might—as usual—have overstated the case, the Soviets are today acting on Khrushchev's maxim in Southeast Asia.

SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

(Continued from page 298)

The tragedy of Soviet science today is that while Kapitsa has great influence, it is men like Keldysh, the President of the Academy of Sciences, who exercise power. And it is they who organize the neo-Stalinist types of action like the expulsion from the C.P.S.U. in April, 1968, of four brilliant mathematicians, all of whom have been awarded the Lenin Prize—Izaak Gelfnd, Yuri Manin, I. R. Shafarevich and Sergei Fomin, the head of Moscow University's Cybernetics Department. The error of these four men was that they had petitioned (with some 90 others from the Mathematics Faculty at Moscow University) for the release from detention in a mental home of the now famous liberal mathematician, Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin. The latter was recently in trouble, for at least the fifth time, because he criticized the sentences passed on writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, and also because he had devised one of the most effective liberal slogans: "Respect Your Own Constitution."¹⁹

One might conclude, perhaps, that Soviet science is already ahead of the United States in numerical "density" in the scientific population, and the equal of the United States in terms of financial outlays after allowing for the different cost and salary structures; but quality and productivity are likely to remain well below the American standard as long as the Soviet Communist party insists on punishing scientists by administrative action simply for holding liberal opinions. Where dissent

cannot be tolerated in the political field, it seems only too probable that it will often be suppressed even in disputes which are largely of a scientific nature.

SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 274)

In sum, it may be asserted with good reason that on balance, despite the inconvenience of the blockage of the Suez Canal, the Soviet Union emerged from the Arab-Israeli conflict with impressive gains. The defeated Arab states, resentful at what they regard as definite American partiality toward Israel, tend to turn to the U.S.S.R. as their one remaining friend among the big powers. Rupture of diplomatic relations, trade boycott, temporary oil embargoes, and the continuing refusal of Syria, Iraq and Egypt to grant to airlines of United States registry overflight rights has created a real vacuum in American-Arab relations, into which the Soviet Union and its satellites are stepping with eagerness and success. The presence of a large Soviet naval contingent (45 ships) in the Mediterranean further adds to the weight of Soviet influence in the area.

As these lines are written, the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis seems to have reached its peak, with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the capitulation of her political leaders. There is already evidence to indicate that this act of undisguised aggression has offered sobering thoughts to those Northern Tier states like Turkey and Iran which in recent years were inclined to accept Soviet protestations of peaceful coexistence at face value. The effect of the Soviet aggression on attitudes in the Arab world will be less clear. In the Arab non-revolutionary states it will confirm the already existing suspicion and fears of Soviet and Communist designs. But in the Arab revolutionary camp the immediate effects may be negligible. Just because the Soviet Union is settling its accounts with a rather remote (from the Arab point of view) Czechoslovak Communist leadership,

¹⁹ *The New York Times*, April 24, 1968.

the basic pro-Soviet orientation of Cairo or Damascus—dictated as it is by their own concept of their true national interest—is not likely to be upset. One indication that indifference is to be expected may be found in the behavior of their controlled press during the crisis; relatively scant attention was paid to news about Soviet-Czechoslovak tensions and negotiations preceding the invasion and often the only sources of news and comments were *Tass* (Soviet press agency) dispatches and articles reprinted from *Pravda* (the Soviet Communist party publication). While even the controlled newspapers could not avoid printing the actual news of the invasion, they generally avoided editorializing in an obvious attempt to avoid mutual embarrassment.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

(Continued from page 287)

Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Soviet influence among the Arab nations has grown steadily. Also significant is the rapid build-up of Soviet naval strength in the Eastern Mediterranean. The United States Sixth Fleet was until recently the undisputed master of these waters. The honor is now shared with the Soviet Navy.

As yet there has been no major confrontation in the Middle East, on land or at sea. Both sides have been careful to avoid it, as the use of the hot-line during the 1967 war indicates. But the United States is in the inferior position, strategically speaking, and continued expansion of Soviet military and political influence will raise for the United States the tension-filled choice of holding firm or retreating. Vietnam gives some indication of what the answer may be.

My thesis, however, is that the two superpowers will probably manage to avoid the ultimate confrontation, and that the future is much more likely to yield agreement upon such important matters as nuclear non-proliferation, ABM restraints, underground testing, and perhaps even such non-military matters

as the exploration of outer space; the allocation of development capital to the Third World or the control of weather patterns.

At this point a new issue arises. When and where might superpower accommodation become detrimental to the other members of the family of nations? So long as accommodation aims only at the prevention of nuclear confrontations which might engulf and destroy other nations, there is no conflict. But is tacit—and perhaps later explicit—recognition of spheres of influence a satisfactory arrangement for the nations living within these spheres? Are the other nations ready to accept United States-Soviet condominium in such important matters as nuclear power, world security, and economic development?

Foreshadowings of this dilemma occurred frequently during the United Nations debate over the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A quotation from the speech of the Indian Representative, Azim Hussain makes the point. After declaring that continued possession of nuclear arms by several great powers was as dangerous to world security as proliferation, he said:⁵

A Treaty of this kind, with its far-reaching political and economic implications for all nations of the world, must not be based upon a discriminatory approach. We have been opposed to the division of the world in terms of ideologies, military alliances, or in terms of rich and poor nations. The proposed treaty adds one more category to the diverse forces which have bred fear and distrust.

SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM

(Continued from page 292)

water power over other forms of electric power generation and the erection of giant and sometimes remotely located industrial plants and farms instead of more modestly designed enterprises, there are many questions that can be asked. In Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the inability to provide satisfactory answers to such questions has led to demands for even faster and more radical reform to prevent the recurrence of such economic waste.

⁵ *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, July 6–13, 1968, p. 22787.

It was just such tendencies in Czechoslovakia that so frightened the Russians during the summer of 1968. Of course there were political questions such as Czechoslovakia's relationship with West Germany, the emergence of political opposition and the lack of censorship that were also prime factors, but the consequences of uninhibited economic reform were certainly of great concern in Moscow at the time. Undoubtedly the demonstration of just where economic reform could lead was also disquieting to those who were uncertain or opposed to economic reform within the U.S.S.R. itself.

But is this the end of economic reform in the U.S.S.R.? It would be most surprising if this were the case. First of all, the Russian reform has not been so unrestrained as the Czech reform appeared to be. Second, the Russians undoubtedly feel they have much better internal control over their people in comparison with the Czechs. Third, and most important, have the Russians really any other choice? Can they avoid economic reform? There is good reason to believe that as the Soviet economy continues to expand and becomes more complex in its interrelationships, there will be ever greater need for the use of more rational tools in decision-making and in the operation of the economy. It may well be that increased use of such devices as computers will facilitate a more rational operation of the economy, but the old system of centralized administration simply cannot cope with the everchanging needs of a sophisticated economy in an era of rapid change.

There is no reason to insist that economic reform need lead inexorably to political reform. There seems to be no reason why an undemocratic political system cannot be imposed on a rational and fairly efficient economic system. But regardless of how potentially subversive economic reform may appear to some opponents, there seems to be no turning back. It may well be that the alternative to the lack of economic reform will be even greater political unrest. Certainly it will mean intolerable economic waste, confusion and discontent.

AFTERMATH OF THE CZECH INVASION

(Continued from page 267)

before the forces of the Warsaw alliance moved across Czech frontiers.

COMPARISON WITH HUNGARY

The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia has been widely compared to the Soviet crackdown in Hungary 12 years earlier and contrasted with Soviet restraint in the face of Rumanian defiance. What accounts for the differences and similarities in Soviet behavior in the three cases? The Soviet Union shares a common frontier with all three countries, the absence of which was an important factor in the successful defiance of both Yugoslavia and Albania. The Soviet intervention in Hungary was inspired by fears that were both genuine and credible. A national anti-Soviet uprising swept Hungary, during which the Imre Nagy regime virtually disestablished the Communist system: the secret police was dismantled and many of its members were executed in summary fashion by outraged vigilante groups and the military; the multi-party system was restored as the Communist party disintegrated; political prisoners were released; Nagy announced Hungary's unilateral withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and enunciated a "neutralist" foreign policy. It should also be remembered that the Hungarian uprising took place against the background of the United States policy of "liberation" under President Dwight Eisenhower, which was avowedly dedicated—in words at least—to the emancipation of the satellites from Soviet domination. The appeals and encouragement of Radio Free Europe appeared to the Kremlin as a further indication of United States malevolence and mischief.

Neither Czechoslovakia nor Rumania have threatened to *withdraw* from the Warsaw Pact, although both have criticized its current organization and Rumania has refused to cooperate with it in recent years. Neither has threatened to disestablish the Communist social order, although the Czechs planned to

"humanize" it, and neither has threatened to pursue a "neutralist" foreign policy, although some Czechs discussed the possibility while Rumania proclaimed her "neutrality" in the Sino-Soviet conflict. And the Communist party has never been threatened with disintegration in either country, although the Czechs were dreaming of the prospect of opposition parties. Most importantly, developments in Czechoslovakia were proceeding in an atmosphere of detente and the total absence of any United States provocations, verbal or otherwise.

RESTRAINT IN RUMANIA

The causes of Soviet intervention in Hungary are relatively uncomplicated when contrasted with the combination of Soviet restraint with respect to Rumania and Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet *threat* to intervene has always been omnipresent in relations with both countries and, for that matter, is a perennial hazard that has been faced by all East European countries as they have advanced from vassalage to clientage. The factional divisions in the Soviet leadership, resulting in periods of inertia and paralysis in the face of difficult decisions, are uncertain and incalculable variables since the balance of factions within the Soviet hierarchy is in a state of continuous flux and the decision to intervene or exercise restraint may be a product of chance. In addition, developments in Czechoslovakia took place after Rumania's defiance, and the sheer cumulative impact of the Rumanian situation was a crucial incremental factor in the Soviet perceptions of threat and danger in the Czech case.

Both Czechoslovakia and Rumania share frontiers with Russia. Both have ceded territory to the Soviet Union but, unlike the Czechs who have no irredentist claims to the Carpatho-Ukraine, the Rumanians have not resigned themselves to the loss of Bessarabia, which is considered to be part of the Rumanian patrimony. The Czechs have tradition-

ally viewed Russia as a potential liberator and protector, whereas in recent decades, the Rumanian image of Russia has been rather negative. The Czechs were allied to the Soviet Union during World War II, whereas Rumania joined the Axis, participated actively in the war against the Soviet Union, re-annexing Bessarabia and adding *Transdnistria* to her territories for good measure. The Czechs fear Germany, who has been the traditional and historic national enemy and oppressor of the Czechs (the Slovaks, however, do not share this perception), whereas Germany has never constituted a direct threat to Rumania, whose dynasty was a branch of the Hohenzollern family. Thus, while it would be natural for the Czechs to rely on the Russians as their protector against Germany, the Rumanians have no need of Russian protection, and on the contrary, are apt to view Russia as a national enemy not above threatening to support Hungarian territorial claims against Rumania, if the need and opportunity arise. And, finally, the Czech Communist party was a broadly-based national party in contrast to the Rumanian Communist party, which had virtually no national base and whose leaders were largely non-ethnic Rumanian *émigrés* sojourning in Moscow as Soviet lackeys.¹⁰

While Rumania's isolated geographical location rendered her vulnerable to Soviet pressure, it simultaneously made her defiance of the Soviet Union a minimal threat to Soviet power and security interests. Furthermore, Rumania's independent policy posed little danger to the vital interests of any other East European state and thus most of her Warsaw Pact allies viewed Rumania's gestures of independence from Moscow with not a little sympathy. Only Hungary has long-standing grievances against Rumania, but Rumania's disaffection from the U.S.S.R. could only benefit Hungary, not injure her. In short, Rumania's defection did not pose a real threat to the Soviet Union or to any other East European country since she was surrounded entirely by Communist states (if one includes Yugoslavia).

On the other hand, Czechoslovakia's geographic location was of special strategic im-

¹⁰ Ceausescu charged in May, 1966, that Moscow deliberately staffed the Rumanian Communist party with non-ethnic Rumanians and *émigrés* to keep it in a permanent condition of servility. *The New York Times*, May 14, 1966.

portance not only to the Soviet Union but to Poland and East Germany as well. Whereas Rumania's independent behavior in foreign policy would be of largely symbolic significance, an independent Czech foreign policy could seriously interfere with coordinated military or diplomatic bloc action, particularly where Germany was concerned. Geographically, Czechoslovakia slices East Europe into a "northern tier" (East Germany and Poland) and a "southern tier" (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia).

Czechoslovakia is the only East European country that simultaneously borders on West Germany and Russia and, indeed, is the only Warsaw Pact state that shares a border with two non-Communist states. Thus she is the most exposed to the West geographically just as she is more related to the West in political traditions, historical associations and general way of life than the other countries of East Europe (East Germany excepted). When one looks at a map of East Europe, Czechoslovakia conjures up the image of an "invasion funnel" leading from West Germany to Russia, or a knife aimed by West Germany at the heart of the Ukraine. Decisions, unfortunately, are often influenced by such banal metaphors.

One final factor distinguishes the Czech case from the Rumanian. In domestic matters, the Rumanians did not challenge the legitimacy of Marxism-Leninism, did not seek to "humanize," "revise" or "liberalize" communism, and hence posed little direct threat to the legitimacy and stability of Soviet-type social orders. Czech liberalization, on the other hand, directly challenged some of the basic principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

This type of challenge should be distinguished from the successful repudiation of the Soviet leaders as the ultimate font of ideological infallibility and orthodox truth. The Soviet leaders long ago adjusted themselves to the loss of their monopoly on doctrinal omniscience and indeed are busily engaged in denying it to the Chinese.

There is some reason to believe that the conservatively-oriented members of the Soviet leadership were just as frightened by the pros-

pect of a successful humanized Communist system in Czechoslovakia that would endeavor to join democratic freedoms and procedures with a Socialist economic order as they were by the specter of a "restoration of capitalism." A humanized, democratized Communist state in the heart of Europe might not only discredit the Soviet model, exposing it as a transitional regional product of Marxism grafted on to the Russian autocratic heritage, but might serve as an attractive model for other East European countries. Even the Russians might be attracted to such an option in preference to their own primitive and outmoded political and economic institutions, which appear to many members of the Soviet scientific, intellectual and technological elite to be a monumental embarrassment and disgrace in the second most powerful and scientifically advanced country in the world.

In analyzing Soviet behavior in East Europe, one cannot exclude the conditioning character of the international environment outside the Communist world. At this point, one can only ask questions without answering them. To what extent was the Soviet move against Czechoslovakia a reflection of the relative strength of Russian nuclear power *vis à vis* the United States? To what extent was the Soviet decision to occupy Czechoslovakia conditioned by the prior knowledge that the United States was unwilling or unable to take either preventive or retaliatory action? To what extent is there a tacitly acknowledged—never admitted but indeed denied—Soviet-American "spheres of influence" arrangement which recognizes that each global power has power to act with relative impunity in its own domain?

To what extent was the Soviet action conditioned by the eroding credibility of the Soviet Union to act promptly to protect its interests, a condition brought about by United States intervention in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean, the challenge of Communist China, the dissolution of Soviet control over the world Communist movement, the apparent disintegration of its empire in Eastern Europe, and the disenchantment of the Arab client states with the Soviet Union's

inability to prevent an Israeli victory in the 1967 war or to force Israel out of the Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank? The fall of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Mohammed Ben Bella in Algeria and Achmed Sukarno in Indonesia may have also reinforced the image of an impotent Soviet behemoth.

Finally, one must ask whether the Soviet move was further conditioned by a debilitating fear of the uncertain intentions of a faction-ridden Chinese leadership, armed with a growing arsenal of thermonuclear weapons and a developing nuclear missile capability, prompting the Soviet leaders to shore up their disintegrating European flank in order to minimize the possibilities of a two-front diplomatic or military maneuver against them.

It is apparent in retrospect that the Czech crisis confronted the Soviet leaders with their moment of truth in East Europe. Until the moment of occupation, it appeared that the Soviet Presidium, after its meetings with the Czech leadership at Cierna and Bratislava, had decided—perhaps by a slim margin—that the consequences of non-intervention would be less disagreeable than those of intervention. Unless we succumb to the view that the Soviet leaders engaged in an act of calculated perfidy, it must be assumed that this decision was precipitously reversed. This seems to be confirmed by the gross ineptness of the political side of the occupation as contrasted with the quick and smooth efficiency of the military operation. The Soviet action

was thus simultaneously a frightening tribute to the immensity of Soviet military power and a dismal monument to diplomatic ineptitude, political incompetence, grotesque morality and the bankruptcy of Communist ideology. The enormity of the Soviet debacle was permanently enshrined by the pathetic inability of 650,000 Warsaw Pact troops to find the elusive and nameless Czech political leaders who invited them to expel the “Western imperialists,” subdue the “counterrevolutionaries” and crush the treacherous “Dubcek clique.”¹¹ Unable to pressure an aged, but unyielding President Ludvik Svoboda to legalize Soviet intervention and unable to persuade even a handful of Czech and Slovak Communists to betray their country by signing the prefabricated Soviet document of invitation and to form a Quisling government, the Soviet Union was forced to deal with the very government which its military forces had arrested. Svoboda was whisked off to Moscow and given a shameless red carpet welcome, while Dubcek, Premier Oldrich Cernik and National Assembly President Josef Smrkovsky were transported to the Soviet capital in chains to “negotiate” a compromise settlement.

It is an eloquent tribute to Czech courage and perhaps to Dubcek's Slovak obstinacy that the Soviet intervention has not been endowed with even a shred of legality and that the faceless sponsors who “invited” the Warsaw Powers to occupy their country have not identified themselves.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

Clearly the Soviet Union has reached an important crossroad in its relationship with East Europe. Before the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet position in East Europe had been slipping, partly in response to the apparent erosion of NATO and the diminution of the United States threat to the Communist system. Either the Soviet empire was on the verge of dissolution—as Rumania virtually seceded from the Warsaw alliance and Czech liberalization threatened to infect all of Eastern Europe—or it was on the brink of a fundamental transformation.

¹¹ The “invitation” was necessary to provide the bare minimum basis of legality for the intervention, since the Warsaw Treaty does not give the member states the blanket authority, collectively or individually, unilaterally to declare the existence of “counter-revolutionaries” and/or external “imperialist forces” and intervene on their own initiative. The juridical scenario employed by Moscow was virtually a carbon copy of U.S. and O.A.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. The so-called invitation, published by *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on August 21, 1968, justified the intervention on both internal and external grounds: “*Tass* is authorized to state that party and state leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have requested the Soviet Union and other allied states to give the fraternal Czechoslovak people immediate assistance, including assistance with armed forces. The reason for this appeal is the threat posed to the socialist system existing in Czechoslovakia and to the constitutionally established state system by counter-revolutionary forces that have entered into collusion with external forces hostile to socialism.”

The transformation could have assumed one of three forms:

1. The conversion of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA into an authentic Socialist "commonwealth of nations," in which the individual members would be allowed a wide latitude of internal deviation from the Soviet norms of socialism, and could exercise greater freedom in trade and cultural relations with the West, while remaining tightly bound to the Soviet Union in a purely defensive alliance. Such a transformation would presuppose a continuation and expansion of the detente, a tacit disavowal of ideological aggressiveness in foreign policy. It would give greater form and shape to the new commonwealth as a regional association, in which the interests of the smaller members would no longer be sacrificed to those of the Soviet Union in the name of the bogus principle of "proletarian internationalism" or subordinated to Soviet great power diplomacy in its dealings with the United States or Communist China. The chief objections to such a transformation before August, 1968, were that it threatened to isolate East Germany, to render Poland even more dependent upon Russia *vis à vis* West Germany, and to deprive the Soviet Union of some useful levers and pressures in dealing with the German problem, the United States and Communist China.

2. The natural *devolution* of the Warsaw Pact, CEMA and other multilateral organizations and their replacement with a series of bilateral and trilateral agreements. The Soviet Union could make periodic *ad hoc* adjustments to the situation, allowing the natural interests of each state to shape its individual relationship with the Soviet Union. Moscow would rely upon a common ideology, intersecting interests, the prudence and good sense of the smaller countries and the reservoir of good will towards Moscow that would flow from such a policy to become the foundation of a new relationship. Under these conditions, the relationships of individual member states with the Soviet Union could vary considerably as would their relations with one another. The artificiality of imposed "fraternal" relations would be replaced by relationships more uncertain but perhaps more durable and natural.

3. The reconstitution of the Soviet Empire as a sphere of influence or domination, similar to the United States position in the Caribbean. Wherever and whenever necessary, naked force and fear would replace reliance on the shibboleths of ideology, pliable local leaders and a common social system, in order to preserve Soviet control.

Apparently Moscow has chosen the third option, which effectively forecloses the other

two. It would seem that the Soviet Union by its action in Czechoslovakia has not only expended whatever reservoir of good will remained of the historical, cultural and ideological associations of the past, but has reduced its options to two: preserving its position by force, threat and periodic intervention; or allowing its control of East Europe to disintegrate completely. For the moment, the Soviet Union has enhanced the credibility of its determination to use its immense power to control its immediate environment, but simultaneously it has restored its reputation for diplomatic perfidy, impetuous brutality and psychological insecurity. Not only the Communist world but the Communist states of East Europe are now irrevocably split. Although there is no discernible military threat in sight from any quarter in Europe, the Soviet Union is now in military occupation of no less than four East European countries (Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia). Albania has unilaterally withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact as a result of the Czech crisis; Rumania refuses to allow Warsaw Pact forces to maneuver on her territory and refuses to participate in their exercises elsewhere. Yugoslavia has never belonged to the Warsaw Pact and at the height of the Czech crisis announced her determination, together with Rumania, to resist by armed force any attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to occupy her territories.

The liberalization in Czechoslovakia has been arrested and is being reversed. Soviet leaders have announced their intention to keep Soviet troops on the Czech-West German frontier indefinitely, but are also imposing their dictates on purely internal Czech affairs, and have refused to allow Czechoslovakia to expand her trade relations outside the Soviet bloc. Like Hungary, Czechoslovakia has been retroverted from clientage to vassalage. While the initial reaction in the other countries of East Europe was fear and apprehension combined with outrage and shame, they are now on notice that the U.S.S.R. will not hesitate to reduce its fraternal allies to vassalage if it disapproves either of their internal or their external policies.

Nevertheless, as the initial shock wears off and the Czechs continue their passive resistance and active non-cooperation, the people of East Europe are likely to become more restive than quiescent. Disturbances might even spread among disaffected and alienated Soviet intellectuals, scientists and students. The moral position of Gomulka has probably been irretrievably damaged, now that Gomulka has stabbed his defenseless neighbor in the back with neither justification nor provocation. Poland, as a consequence, has been more tightly riveted to dependence upon the Soviet Union and is now completely surrounded by countries under Soviet military occupation, with her people even more thoroughly alienated from Moscow. It may be that Gomulka sold his country's honor mainly to gain a tactical advantage over his internal rival, General Mieczyslaw Moczar, and in return for a mess of potage established a precedent for the future Soviet military occupation of Poland in the guise of "multi-lateral" action.

Communist parties in East European countries will continue to pay greater and greater attention to national needs rather than to Soviet dictates and interests, although the danger of a desperate Soviet intervention has increased. But interventionism itself is a

wasting asset and cannot be sustained indefinitely; thus the Soviet Union's military occupation of Czechoslovakia simultaneously signifies its determination to reintensify control, and at the same time risks contracting its range of control.

In spite of the Soviet action, as time goes on, the ideological bond of communism will continue to erode and East European countries will become more European and less "Communist." Today, everywhere in East Europe, in contrast to the Soviet Union, communism appears as a thin, almost transparent, veneer ready to be shed the moment the climate is felicitous. Fundamental and far-reaching transformations are still imminent in East Europe; and perhaps for at least another decade, these changes will take place in the name of communism while simultaneously subverting it. While similar changes will also take place in Russia, the necessity or desire to disavow communism as an ideology there may not be nearly so intense. After all, Soviet society and Marxism-Leninism are Russian creations and thus are not so incompatible with Russian nationalism as they are with the nationalisms of non-Soviet countries. The Communist system is an indigenous Russian phenomenon; in East Europe it is an alien, forceably imported system.

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D. G. REDMOND, JR., Publisher

The Month In Review

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of September, 1968, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Czechoslovak Crisis

Sept. 1—The Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist party, ending a 2-day meeting at Hradcany Castle, Czechoslovakia, elects an enlarged Presidium with 21 full members. Of that number, only 2 are hard-core pro-Soviet conservative Communists. Alexander Dubcek will continue as the party's First Secretary; Premier Oldrich Cernik and President of the National Assembly Josef Smrkovsky are reelected to the Presidium.

Pravda (Soviet Communist party newspaper) prints an attack on a liberal publication being published clandestinely since the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops. *Pravda* warns that, in Czechoslovakia, "the counterrevolutionary forces must be and will be bridled." (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Sept. 2—In Prague, "authoritative military sources" report that the 2 East German divisions that participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia last month have been withdrawn. Soviet, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Polish forces totaling 600,000 or more men remain.

Sept. 3—The Prague radio announces that Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Ota Sik, known to be objectionable to the Soviet Union, has resigned. He has initiated liberal economic reforms.

Sept. 6—Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov meets in Prague with Czechoslovak President Ludvik Svoboda.

Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek returns to Czechoslovakia from Austria.

Pravda publishes a definition of what the Soviet Union would consider a return to

"normalization" in Czechoslovakia, a condition that the Soviets (in the August 26 agreement with Czechoslovakia) stipulated must be met before occupation forces would be withdrawn. "The process of normalization means, first of all, the complete exposure and stamping out of the subversive activities of the right-wing, antisocialist forces" and the strengthening of the Communist party's control over the country.

Sept. 7—Kuznetsov meets with Czechoslovak party leader Alexander Dubcek.

Sept. 10—Premier Oldrich Cernik of Czechoslovakia meets in Moscow with Leonid I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist party, Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin and Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny. A communiqué reveals that economic trade agreements have been signed by Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

Within minutes after Cernik returns, the Czechoslovak government issues a proclamation assuring the people that there will not be a reign of terror and that the government is "fully conscious of our obligation to insure the personal freedom and safety of all of our fellow citizens, workers, farmers, artists, scientists, young and old."

Sept. 11—Soviet tanks leave Prague for nearby bases.

Sept. 13—At a closed session, 275 deputies to the Czechoslovak National Assembly approve the government bill on "preventive censorship"; the restoration of press, radio and television censorship was called for in the agreement with the Soviet Union last month. Included in the legislation is provision for certain restrictive police measures.

Sept. 19—The Czechoslovak government accepts the resignation of Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek, thus acceding to Soviet demands

for the removal of certain persons objectionable to Moscow.

Sept. 20—*Rude Pravo* (official Czechoslovak Communist party paper) publishes excerpts from a letter that was sent to all Communist party groups throughout the country by the Presidium of the Communist party. The letter states that the Moscow accord of August, 1968, does not signal a return to the "pre-January policies" in existence before democratization. (For excerpts from this accord, see page 300.)

Dubcek and Svoboda arrive at the Brno International Trade Fair where a crowd numbering in the tens of thousands welcomes the 2 leaders.

Sept. 21—In a speech at Ostrava, Premier Oldrich Cernik declares that within a few days most of the Warsaw Pact occupying forces will begin to withdraw gradually, although "certain contingents of foreign troops" will continue to be stationed in Czechoslovakia. Cernik declares that at the summit meeting in Cierna, the Czechoslovak government did not agree to slow down the liberalization process: "We only informed the Soviet representatives what course we would take in the future to prevent both leftist and rightist excesses."

Sept. 22—*The New York Times* reports that a large number of Soviet military and civilian advisers are moving into Prague.

Sept. 23—It is reported from Prague that the U.S.S.R. will withdraw 20 army divisions from Czechoslovakia by October 28, leaving from 6 to 8 divisions in Czechoslovakia.

Sept. 24—It is disclosed in Prague that Alexander Dubcek's trip to the Soviet Union, scheduled for this morning, has been cancelled. There has been new Soviet-Czechoslovak tension over "normalization." Last week Moscow charged that Prague was not fulfilling its commitments to promote "normalization," citing Czechoslovak reluctance to enforce strict censorship.

Sept. 29—The withdrawal of Czechoslovak troops from the Mlada military base begins; the base will be used for the Soviet Seventh Army.

European Economic Market (Common Market)

Sept. 27—At a meeting of the Common Market Council of Ministers, French Foreign Minister Michel Debré rejects a German proposal to reduce industrial tariffs with Britain by 30 per cent over a 3-year period, an interim accord that would have paved the way for eventual British entry into the E.E.C.

Middle East

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Sept. 1—The El Al airliner hijacked on July 23, and held in Algeria, returns to Israel. The Israeli crewmen and 5 Israeli passengers arrived in Israel 12 hours earlier.

The Arab League opens its semiannual meeting in Cairo with foreign ministers and other officials from the 14 member states.

Sept. 3—Israel informs the Red Cross that it will release 16 Arab infiltrators because of the return of the Israeli airliner.

Sept. 4—In Tel Aviv, bomb explosions kill one and injure 51 persons; the bombings are assumed to have been set off by Arab commandos. Following the explosions, Israeli crowds turn against Arab civilians in the vicinity of the explosion and attack Arab shops.

Sept. 6—Israeli police in Tel Aviv announce that the Arab commandos responsible for the bombings have been apprehended.

Sept. 8—After 4 hours of shelling along the Suez Canal from Port Suez to Qantara, it is reported that 10 Israeli soldiers have been killed and 17 wounded in battles with Egyptian forces.

Sept. 17—Israeli forces shell Irbid, Jordan's 2nd largest city, in retaliation for an Arab terrorist rocket attack against an Israeli town.

Sept. 25—In Washington, U.S. government officials reveal that 2 weeks ago the Soviet Union presented a compromise Middle East peace plan to the U.S.

Sept. 26—Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban declares that the Israeli government has rejected the Soviet peace plan presented to the U.S. a few weeks ago; according to

Eban, the plan is the same as that offered by the Russians to the U.N. Security Council on November 22, 1967.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See also *France* and *West Germany*)

Sept. 22—The top military leaders of NATO arrive in Athens for an inspection tour of Italy, Greece and Turkey.

Organization of African Unity

Sept. 13—At the opening session of the fifth meeting of heads of state and government of O.A.U. members in Algiers, Zambian President Kenneth D. Kaunda refuses the vice-presidency because of his opposition to O.A.U. support for Nigerian unity. Zambia has recognized Biafra, the secessionist Eastern Region of Nigeria.

Sept. 17—The O.A.U. meeting ends. Secretary General Diallo Telli is reelected to a second 4-year term.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)

Sept. 10—SEATO Secretary General Jesus M. Vargas of the Philippines issues a 56-page review of developments in Southeast Asia noting that Communist activity in 5 member states—Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Burma and Malaysia—has intensified during the year.

United Nations

(See also *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 4—At a meeting of the Security Council requested by the U.A.R. and Israel, each side accuses the other of violating the cease-fire agreement. U.N. Secretary General U Thant tells the council that the U.N. truce supervisory organization's observation post has reported that Israeli forces used ground-to-ground missiles against the U.A.R. in a clash near the Suez Canal.

Sept. 18—The Security Council adopts a resolution asking that Israel and the Arab states respect the Middle East cease-fire ordered by the Security Council. The resolution asks Israel and the Arab nations to cooper-

ate with the U.N. special representative in the Middle East, Gunnar V. Jarring.

Sept. 23—At a news conference, U.N. Secretary General U Thant declares that if a U.N. resolution were presented urging an end to U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, a majority of the 124 members would vote approval.

Sept. 24—Emilio Arenales Catalán, foreign minister of Guatemala, is elected president of the U.N. General Assembly. He presides over the first session of the 23d Assembly session. Swaziland is elected as the 125th U.N. member.

Sept. 26—U Thant, in the introduction to his annual report on the U.N., proposes that the leaders of the U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain and France meet to try to reduce world tensions.

War in Vietnam

Sept. 2—*The New York Times* reports that the U.S. military command in Vietnam has ordered the heaviest air strikes in weeks along enemy infiltration routes into Saigon.

Sept. 11—It is reported that enemy forces have launched a heavy attack against Tay-ninh, 55 miles northeast of Saigon.

At the Paris peace talks, W. Averell Har-ri-man, chief U. S. negotiator, declares that 12,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces have been killed since August 18, 1968. The chief North Vietnamese delegate, Xuan Thuy, declares that 62,000 allied troops were killed in August, 1968.

Sept. 13—Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops fight with allied forces near Tay-ninh while withdrawing from the city's edge.

Sept. 14—It is reported that allied forces have killed over 400 enemy soldiers in a series of battles during the past day along the demilitarized zone.

Sept. 16—It is reported that allied forces have discovered and seized 27 tons of enemy ammunition in a jungle north of Saigon.

Sept. 20—Some 2,000 U. S. marines are air-lifted into the demilitarized zone to prevent an enemy buildup there.

Sept. 30—The world's only active battleship,

the U.S.S. *New Jersey*, goes into action against North Vietnam.

ALBANIA

Sept. 13—The Albanian Parliament votes to withdraw formally from the Warsaw Pact.

ARGENTINA

Sept. 13—Wrecked cars and debris litter the streets of Buenos Aires as violence erupts during a 24-hour strike called by student organizations.

AUSTRIA

Sept. 5—Officials of the Austrian Labor Agency report that many skilled Czechoslovak workers are receiving work permits in Austria after leaving Czechoslovakia.

Sept. 18—A one-day special session of the National Council, the lower House of Parliament, receives a pledge from Chancellor Josef Klaus that his government will defend Austria's permanent neutrality.

Sept. 20—*Volksblatt*, the newspaper of the governing party, addresses an appeal to the Soviet Union to respect Austrian neutrality.

BOLIVIA

Sept. 10—President René Barrientos Ortuño closes the state schools 2 months before the end of the school year as 25,000 teachers strike for more pay. He also warns that all teachers who joined the walkout will lose their jobs.

Sept. 21—President Barrientos denies that the C.I.A. is operating in Bolivia. The denial is in response to last month's charges of C.I.A. influence in Bolivia by former Interior Minister Antonio Arguedas.

BRAZIL

Sept. 7—President Eduardo Frei Montalva of Chile joins President Artur da Costa e Silva of Brazil in watching a parade of Brazilian armed forces during Independence Day celebrations. President Frei is in Brazil on an 8-day visit to gain greater support from Brazil for a Latin American economic cooperation program.

Sept. 22—Officials of 19 armies of Western Hemisphere states arrive in Rio de Janeiro for a 5-day conference to discuss internal security, civic action by the military and international cooperation. General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, heads the U. S. delegation.

BULGARIA

(See also *Intl, Czech Crisis*)

Sept. 7—The Bulgarian press agency reports that Bulgarian troops have ended 2 weeks of maneuvers in eastern Bulgaria near the Rumanian border.

CANADA

Sept. 19—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau assures the House of Commons that Canada will honor her NATO obligations if an ally is under military attack.

CHILE

(See also *Brazil*)

Sept. 17—It is reported that arms have begun to appear in clashes between landlords and peasants in the countryside as the severe drought sharpens the struggle over President Eduardo Frei's agrarian reforms.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Sept. 2—Following a directive issued by Chairman Mao Tse-tung last week, groups of workers, soldiers and peasants begin to take control of newspapers throughout China.

Sept. 6—The official government radio in Peking announces the formation of revolutionary committees to govern Sinkiang and Tibet.

Sept. 7—Editorials in *Jenmin Jih Pao* and *Chiehfang Chun Pao*, official Chinese government newspapers, claim an "all-out" victory for the cultural revolution in all provinces, autonomous areas and special municipalities.

Sept. 16—*Jenmin Jih Pao* reports that peasant-soldier teams taking over schools in rural China have been given a model to follow. The model system has 9 grades

(3 less than before) and allows free time for students to do farm labor.

Sept. 25—*Hsinhua*, the Chinese Communist news agency, claims an "all-around leap forward" in industrial production.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF (Brazzaville)

Sept. 1—Statements by Army leaders indicate that the military government which staged a coup last month will retain "national socialism" but will work with other ideologies.

Sept. 4—Captain Alfred Raoul has been installed as interim President by the military junta. The resignation of former President Alphonse Massemba-Debat for "failure to assure peace and national unity" is announced.

CUBA

Sept. 7—It is reported that the Cuban government has started a campaign to ration electricity in order to save petroleum. The Havana radio says massive efforts will be made to reduce the consumption of electricity in homes, schools, offices and social centers.

Sept. 8—The Economic Research Bureau, operated by Cuban exiles, estimates Cuban sugar production for this year at 5 million tons—3 million tons short of the Cuban government's goal.

ECUADOR

Sept. 1—Dr. José Maria Velasco Ibarra is inaugurated for a fifth term as President of Ecuador.

FRANCE

(See also *Int'l. E.E.C.*)

Sept. 4—Currency controls are lifted by the French government. They were imposed on May 29 during the strike crisis.

Sept. 9—In his first news conference in over 9 months, President Charles de Gaulle assails the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops but vows to continue his policy of détente with the U.S.S.R. He also restates French support for Biafra.

Sept. 10—A student demonstration at the University of Paris breaks up examinations at the Medical School.

Foreign Minister Michel Debré says that France will not attend any special meeting of the NATO ministers.

Sept. 20—The Cabinet adopts a bill to reform the French educational system. More autonomy is given the individual universities.

Sept. 28—President de Gaulle assures West German Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger that France will stand with West Germany if the Soviet Union should attack.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Sept. 17—The Government announces that compulsory military training is to be extended to cover most of the population.

Sept. 19—East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht confers with Soviet Ambassador to East Germany Pyotr A. Abrasimov on the "intensification of militarism and revanchism in West Germany."

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *France, East Germany and U.S.S.R.*)

Sept. 19—Commanders of the allied forces in West Germany impose penal measures to curb left-wing radicals from impeding free access along the routes to West Germany from West Berlin.

Sept. 21—Despite mounting Soviet pressure, right-wing extremists of the National Democratic party announce they will hold a scheduled meeting in West Berlin.

Sept. 25—Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger tells the *Bundestag*, the lower house of Parliament, that "a reappraisal of the strength of NATO forces in Europe is unavoidable" following the Warsaw Pact forces invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Sept. 30—On the 30th anniversary of the Munich Pact, West German spokesman Gunter Diehl says West Germany has no territorial claims against Czechoslovakia.

GREECE

Sept. 7—An announcement by the Greek military government reports that 20 persons have been arrested following an assassination attempt against Premier George Papadopoulos last August. All are said to have confessed their guilt.

Sept. 14—A final draft of the proposed new constitution is approved by the Greek Cabinet. Voting will take place on September 29.

Sept. 23—The army-supported government frees 7 former government officials, including 2 premiers, George Papandreou and Panayotis Canellopoulos.

Sept. 29—The new constitution is approved by about 97 per cent of the voters. The new charter suspends many basic civil rights and deprives the monarchy of most of its powers.

HAITI

Sept. 5—President François Duvalier announces he will free David Knox, director of information for the Bahamas, who has been sentenced to death on spying charges in connection with last May's abortive invasion attempt.

INDIA

Sept. 11—The Indian government announces that an autonomous state will be created within the State of Assam.

INDONESIA

Sept. 28—The government announces that former President Sukarno is being held for questioning. Sukarno has been under virtual house arrest for 2 years.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East* and *U.N.*)

Sept. 6—Zeev Sharef, Israeli Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry, announces a 15 per cent tariff cut effective October 1. A further 10 per cent cut will take effect January 1, 1969.

JAPAN

Sept. 12—Some 8,000 students rally in pro-

test against rigid university rules and the admitted misuse of funds by university officials.

MALAYSIA

(See *Philippines*)

MEXICO

Sept. 1—As serious student disorders continue, President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz warns he is ready to use armed force to put down "systematic provocation" and to insure that the Olympic Games will be held as scheduled in October in Mexico City.

Sept. 3—It is reported that last night student strike leaders said at a news conference they would use "all means within our reach to obtain solutions to our demands." The students are demanding dismissal of the police chief of Mexico City and his assistant; respect for university autonomy; compensation for those killed and hurt in last month's fighting; investigation of persons responsible for brutality against them; freedom for all persons they describe as political prisoners; and abolition of those sections of the penal code that provide punishment for subversive acts and acts inimical to public order.

Sept. 8—Students call for new mass street demonstrations on September 13 despite the urging of the rector of the National University for a return to normal operations.

Sept. 13—An hour after President Diaz returns to his residence from inaugurating 7 sites for the Olympic Games, students stage a silent march from Chapultepec Park to the National Palace.

Sept. 19—The army seizes control of the National University in a move to end student agitation.

Sept. 20—Fighting between police and students continues for a second day following the army's seizure of the National University.

Sept. 22—A policeman is shot to death, scores of people are injured and hundreds arrested as student disorders continue.

Sept. 27—Determination to continue their

protest is voiced by some 5,000 university students. The agitation, begun 2 months ago to demand university reform, now includes protests against the national government. Fifteen persons, mostly students, have been killed in the past week as violence continues over police occupation of the university.

NIGERIA

(See also *Intl, O.A.U.*)

Sept. 9—An announcement by a spokesman for the Organization of African Unity says that peace talks being held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between Nigerian and Biafran negotiators have been indefinitely postponed. The talks began August 4 and have made no headway.

Sept. 16—The Biafran town of Owerri, one of her two remaining strongholds, is captured by Nigerian armed forces.

PERU

Sept. 2—It is reported that President Oswaldo Herccelles has announced in Congress that Peru expects more than \$1 billion in new foreign private investment in the next 5 years in copper, phosphates and petroleum.

PHILIPPINES

Sept. 18—A bill declaring Malaysian Sabah to be part of Philippine territory is signed into law by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Sept. 19—Diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines are suspended over the Sabah issue.

Sept. 23—Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman is invited by President Marcos to a meeting to discuss the Sabah crisis.

PORTUGAL

Sept. 27—Marcelo Caetano assumes the premiership, replacing ailing Antonio de Oliveira Salazar.

RHODESIA

Sept. 13—The government of Prime Minister Ian D. Smith is declared valid by 3 Rhodesian judges acting as a court of appeal of the Rhodesian High Court.

SOUTH YEMEN

Sept. 15—Major General Hassan al-Amri forms a new cabinet. On September 4 the Sana radio reported that the cabinet resigned after fighting broke out between rival republican army forces.

SWEDEN

Sept. 16—Early returns from yesterday's elections give the Social Democrats a wide margin of victory. The party has held office for 36 years.

THAILAND

Sept. 2—The first election in 10 years takes place in Bangkok. Local issues dominated the campaign. The Opposition Democratic party wins 22 of the 24 seats.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Czech Crisis*)

Sept. 5—Stepan V. Chervonenko, Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, flies to Moscow where the Soviet Central Committee has reportedly been meeting to discuss the problems of controlling the Czechoslovak government. Chervonenko is a member of the Central Committee.

Sept. 18—*Pravda* (Soviet Communist party newspaper) publishes an article asserting the Soviet right to intervene militarily in West Germany if necessary to curb "neo-Nazism and militarism."

Sept. 22—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) announces that the automatic spacecraft, *Zond 5*, launched on September 15 for a flight around the moon, has successfully completed its mission. *Zond 5* reentered earth's atmosphere and landed in the Indian Ocean yesterday evening.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

UNITED KINGDOM, THE

(See also *Intl, E.E.C.*)

Sept. 8—The Bank for International Settlements agrees on a \$2 billion stand-by credit to support the British pound.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

((See also *Labor*)

Sept. 3—Attorney General Ramsey Clark announces that \$3.9 billion is being granted to 40 states under the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, for police training and equipment and for strengthening police community relations work.

Sept. 5—A number of off-duty policemen attack a small group of Black Panthers as they are brought into the Brooklyn, New York, Criminal Court.

Sept. 6—Special classes in "liberation schools" are begun in Boston under the direction of Negro parents, to protest conditions in the public schools in Boston's Negro districts. Primary classes are being held in neighborhood houses.

Sept. 7—The public schools of Hartford, Connecticut, widen their plan to bus Negro and Puerto Rican students to schools in surrounding suburbs. 70 schools in 13 towns are now involved.

Berkeley, California, public schools become the first in a large city system to complete the integration of pupils throughout all 12 grades. All schools will reflect the community ratio of white, Negro and Oriental students.

Sept. 8—Protests over a desegregation plan force the closing of all 21 public schools in Chesterfield County, South Carolina.

Sept. 10—Alabama Secretary of State Mabel Amos rules that 19 of the 20 candidates of the predominantly Negro National Democratic party may not appear on the ballot because the party is charged with failing to comply with state election laws.

Oakland, California, Police Chief Charles R. Gain orders the arrest and dismissal of 2 policemen who fired into the local headquarters of the Black Panther party this morning.

Negro students admitted to the University of Illinois under a special scholarship program are arrested following a furniture-smashing demonstration held by the Negro students to protest housing problems.

Sept. 14—The Selective Service System reports that since early 1967 the number of Negroes serving on local draft boards has risen from 278 to 820. Negroes now comprise some 4.6 per cent of the 17,650 board members.

Sept. 15—In Chesterfield County, South Carolina, public schools are reopening under a desegregation plan involving "freedom of choice" after being closed one week because white parents protested the elimination of all segregation.

Sept. 16—The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) adopts a constitution favoring black nationalism. At its reconvened annual convention, Roy Innis has been elected national director, replacing Floyd B. McKissick.

Economy

Sept. 10—The Treasury Department reveals it has purchased \$220 million in gold from France during the second quarter of 1968.

Sept. 11—The Labor Department announces that in August unemployment dropped to 3.5 per cent of the work force, equaling a 17-year low.

Sept. 16—The Chrysler Corporation reports that there will be an average price increase of 2.9 per cent, some \$89, for its 1969 cars.

Sept. 17—President Lyndon Johnson criticizes the Chrysler Corporation's price increase as a "sharp blow" to the fight against inflation and as "excessive."

Sept. 23—The General Motors Corporation announces a price rise of some 2 per cent on its 1969 cars.

Sept. 25—The Ford Motor Company announces a price rise of some 2 per cent on its 1969 cars.

Sept. 26—The Chrysler Corporation lowers its planned price increase; its 1969 prices will be closer to the government-approved 2 per cent rise.

Foreign Policy

((See also *Intl, Czech Crisis*)

Sept. 6—The State Department announces the cancellation of a semi-official cultural

exchange program with Poland, in retaliation for Poland's part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Sept. 8—Administration officials reveal that the Government is pressing its NATO allies to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Sept. 14—The President is reported by Administration sources to have decided not to sell F-4 Phantom jets to Israel at the present time. Israel has asked for some 50 of these 1,200-mile-an-hour jets.

Sept. 26—The resignation of George Ball as chief U. S. representative to the U.N. is announced by President Johnson, who names *Washington Post* editor Russell Wiggins to succeed Ball. Ball, who will become a foreign policy adviser to the Democratic presidential candidate, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, tells a press conference he feels Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon "lamentably lacks" qualifications in the field of foreign policy.

Government

Sept. 6—President Lyndon B. Johnson asks Congress to authorize the spending of \$1 billion over the ceiling set for fiscal 1969. Mandatory cost increases for farm support and Medicare are cited as reasons for the request.

Sept. 9—A compromise authorization for \$1.9 billion in foreign aid is approved by a House-Senate committee. The bill provides the smallest authorization since 1946.

Sept. 11—H. Rex Lee, former Governor of American Samoa, is named to membership on the Federal Communications Commission by President Johnson.

Sept. 19—The President receives a bill to establish a 58,000-acre Redwood National Park in northern California's coastal forest area.

Sept. 25—Focusing on what they term Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas' "sense of propriety," Senators opposing his nomination as Supreme Court Chief Justice begin a filibuster.

The Senate completes congressional ac-

tion on a \$14.5-billion money bill that includes funds for city housing programs for the 12 months ending June 30, 1969.

Sept. 26—The Senate majority leader, Montana Senator Mike Mansfield (D.), reveals plans to vote on ending the filibuster against the Fortas nomination on October 1.

The Senate takes final congressional action on a compromise bill to authorize a national wild and scenic river system, including all or parts of 8 rivers.

Labor

Sept. 1—Striking electrical workers reject a contract offered by the Illinois Bell Telephone Company. The strike has been in effect since May 8.

Sept. 9—New York City's schools do not open for 1.1 million children because of a strike of the United Federation of Teachers; the union demands the reinstatement of 110 teachers in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Demonstration School District. Last spring the local district school board insisted that 10 teachers be ousted from their posts; 100 teachers who protested their ouster were also barred from the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district.

Sept. 29—New York's Mayor John Lindsay announces that the United Federation of Teachers has reached an agreement with New York's Board of Education. By order of the board, the ousted 110 teachers are to return to the Ocean Hill-Brownsville section of Brooklyn; 52,000 striking teachers will return to work and New York City's schools will open on September 30.

Sept. 30—The President invokes the Taft-Hartley Act to postpone a strike of some 75,000 longshoremen called for October 1 by the International Longshoremen's Association.

Military

Sept. 13—The Navy reveals that it will release 30,000 reservists from active duty ahead of schedule to save \$48 million in the 1969 fiscal year.

Sept. 16—The Navy announces that before November 1 it will release 593 naval air

reservists called to active duty after the seizure of the U. S. intelligence ship *Pueblo* by North Korea in January, 1968.

Sept. 25—All F-111 flights are cancelled by the Air Force temporarily after an F-111 crashed September 23 at Las Vegas, Nevada.

Politics

(See also *Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 9—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller names Representative Charles E. Goodell, a Republican, to fill the Senate seat left vacant by the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy, a Democrat, in June, 1968.

Sept. 10—Maryland's Governor Spiro Agnew, Republican vice-presidential candidate, tells newsmen that Vice President Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic presidential candidate, has been "soft on communism . . . over the years."

Sept. 11—President Lyndon Johnson asks presidential candidates Humphrey, Nixon, and George Wallace to send representatives to the White House for conferences to "promote the orderly transfer of the executive power." Former Alabama Governor Wallace is the presidential candidate of the American Independent party.

Sept. 12—Agnew retracts his comment that Humphrey has been "soft on communism."

Addressing a Southern television audience, Nixon criticizes the federal government's methods of enforcing the Supreme Court's 1954 school desegregation decision.

Sept. 14—According to results of a *New York Times* poll released today, if the election were held now, Richard Nixon would win, carrying 30 states with an electoral vote of 346; Wallace would be second, carrying 8 states with 77 electoral votes; Humphrey would carry 6 states plus the District of Columbia with 42 electoral votes. Gallup Poll results indicate Nixon leading Humphrey 43 per cent to 31 per cent, with Wallace holding 19 per cent of the popular vote.

Sept. 19—Vice President Humphrey and Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy are jeered by antiwar demonstrators as they

speak to a crowd of some 10,000 in downtown Boston.

Sept. 23—Agnew in Hawaii says that when he referred to Polish-Americans as "Polacks" and to an American newsman traveling with him as a "fat Jap," he did not intend to offend anyone or cast racial slurs.

Sept. 26—Humphrey says he will study the Vietnamese situation with "new advisers" but reaffirms his support of the war.

Sept. 30—If he is elected President, Humphrey promises to end the bombing of North Vietnam if he finds "evidence—direct or indirect"—that the North Vietnamese will restore the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam.

Supreme Court

(See *Government*)

URUGUAY

Sept. 19—A 24-hour general strike by leftist-led unions closes Montevideo's transport system, schools, newspapers and hundreds of manufacturing plants.

Sept. 22—After days of bloody street fighting the Government closes secondary schools and universities and calls out the army to join the police in trying to restore order.

VENEZUELA

Sept. 14—The police report that one person was killed and at least 4 injured in yesterday's clashes between members of the Democratic Action party and the People's Electoral Movement. Both organizations are preparing for the presidential election in December.

YUGOSLAVIA

Sept. 5—Speaking at a luncheon for visiting President Moktar Ould Daddad of Mauritania, President Tito calls for "an urgent withdrawal" of occupation forces from Czechoslovakia.

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